




Bulletin



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ICIAL

WEEKLY RECORD

UNITED STATES

FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLI, No. 1061 • PUBLICATION 6901

October 26, 1959

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:
52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25
Single copy, 25 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 20, 1958).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

Strengthening the Foundations of Freedom in the Far East

by Under Secretary Dillon¹

I am happy to be here with you tonight and to have this timely opportunity to review recent developments in the Far East. You have been privileged during your conference to hear some of Asia's most distinguished leaders talk of their policies and problems in frank and constructive terms. I, in turn, wish to discuss United States policies toward the Far East and to outline the manner in which they are helping to strengthen the foundations of freedom in that important area of the world.

One year ago, almost to the day, the late John Foster Dulles stood before this same Council during the height of the sustained Chinese Communist attacks in the Taiwan Straits. He defined with unmistakable clarity the stakes involved in that attack. He said,²

What is involved is a Communist challenge to the basic principle of peace that armed force should not be used for aggression. Upon the observance and enforcement of that principle depends world order everywhere.

Secretary Dulles declared that the United States would stand firm and not retreat in the face of armed aggression. We, and our ally, the Government of the Republic of China, stood firm. The challenge was met, and the Communist resort to naked force failed of its goal. Ten million human beings on Taiwan were not delivered into slavery.

You will recall that at this time last year the

United States, in accordance with the obligations of the United Nations Charter, also reiterated its guiding philosophy of readiness to settle this dispute "by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." We then welcomed the move by the Chinese Communist Premier, Chou En-lai, to resume bilateral ambassadorial talks begun at Geneva in 1955 and expressed the hope that an acceptable cease-fire could be arranged.³

Shortly thereafter this reiteration of peaceful intent was reinforced by President Eisenhower when he suggested, in correspondence with Chairman Khrushchev, that the Soviet Union urge the Chinese Communists to turn to a policy of peaceful settlement in the Taiwan area.⁴

Developments in Taiwan Area

Now, in retrospect, what was the net result of the tumultuous events in the Taiwan area during the autumn of 1958?

I would answer that a potential war was averted by our firm stand against the Chinese Communist use of force.

Since then the heavy Red bombardment of August 1958 has dwindled to token shelling on a senseless, alternate-day basis. While tensions have been somewhat relaxed, basic fears of irrational and explosive behavior by the Chinese Communists persist.

The Peiping regime has demonstrated abso-

¹ Address made before the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry, Inc., at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7 (press release 706).

² BULLETIN of Oct. 13, 1958, p. 561.

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1958, p. 481.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 498.

lutely no disposition to make the slightest move toward an agreement on a cease-fire or a renunciation of force. Its recalcitrance at the negotiating table has been maintained since the talks were resumed at Warsaw more than a full year ago. The depth of the Peiping regime's contempt for world opinion became fully apparent this past spring, when it cruelly and ruthlessly extinguished the last vestiges of freedom in Tibet. The Dalai Lama fled to India in order to preserve the symbol of the spiritual and temporal resistance of the courageous Tibetan people. This gross shock to Asian and world sensibilities was still reverberating when Peiping unleashed a torrent of abuse against one of the world's most dedicated men, India's Prime Minister Nehru. That action, coupled with incursions across the frontier into Indian territory, compounded the shocked dismay produced by the brutal massacres in Tibet.

Question of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Very recently we have had cause to hope that at long last the Communists were preparing to put aside the use of threats and force to achieve their objectives. We recall the joint communique at Camp David wherein President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev agreed that "all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the application of force but by peaceful means through negotiation."⁵

Then Mr. Khrushchev flew to Peiping for the 10th anniversary celebration of the Chinese Communist regime. In his three major addresses at Peiping he counseled against the use of force, repeating some of the peace and disarmament themes he had used here in the United States.

I regret having to report that the initial Chinese Communist reaction was not encouraging. For the Chinese Communist authorities appear to have heavily edited Chairman Khrushchev's speeches in the initial domestic output of their controlled radio. Deleted were Khrushchev's strictures against "testing the capitalist system by force," against waging "predatory wars," and against "imposing socialism by force of arms" because "the people would not understand."

Instead, the population of mainland China and the Chinese Communist armed forces were

treated to an order of the day by Chinese Communist Defense Minister Lin Piao, at the October 1 National Day parade in Peiping, in which Lin Piao attacked the alleged "aggressive schemes" of the United States. He then proclaimed that no foreign countries would be allowed to interfere in Peiping's so-called "liberation" of Taiwan. These words were echoed by other Chinese Communist leaders, including Liu Shao-chi, the Chairman, or chief of state, of the Chinese Communist regime.

In the light of the Chinese Communist record of the last decade—and especially that of the past year—these pronouncements forbid any optimism on the future of Peiping's foreign policy. Too fresh in our memories are the attacks on the offshore islands, Tibet, Laos, the borders of India—the intensive hate-America campaigns, and the institution of the commune system with its militaristic overtones.

But in spite of all this we still must hope that the Chinese Communist overlords will, after reflection, heed the advice of the Soviet Union, whose leadership over the international Communist movement they themselves recognize, and adhere to Chairman Khrushchev's proposition that differences must be settled by negotiation and *not* by force.

Of special import is the stepping up by the Chinese Communists of their propaganda attacks against the United States, while, at the same time, they continue to emphasize their close ties with the Soviet Union and their subordination to their senior partner in what they call the "great camp of peace, democracy, and socialism headed by the Soviet Union." If we are to believe the Communists' own reiterated recognition of Soviet leadership, then the men in the Kremlin must share responsibility for Peiping's actions.

The time has come for all of us, on both sides of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, to face squarely the issue of whether we can afford to permit *any* dispute *anywhere* to be settled by recourse to arms. We firmly reject attempts by Communist leaders to justify what they call "just, revolutionary wars" or "wars of liberation." War is war, no matter where or why it may be fought. Peace also is indivisible. Peace is not the prerogative of the Communists alone, nor can it be applied only to areas outside the immediate concern of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 12, 1959, p. 499.

There can be no glossing over the danger that an attempt to seize Taiwan and the offshore islands is just as likely to embroil the world community in total war as is the launching of any other type of war.

There can be no exceptions in the matter of peaceful settlement of disputes.

Once this fact adequately impresses itself upon the thinking of our shrinking planet and is reflected in its actions and outlook everywhere, there will assuredly be an atmosphere conducive to the broad-scale disarmament and peaceful progress so fervently desired by all men of good will.

We earnestly hope Peiping will see the light.

The Asian Revolution

I am confident that our hope is shared by the peoples of free Asia, who are crying out today for economic and social progress. They are driving for greater freedom for the human spirit. They are reaching out for a larger share of the good things of life. They are at the beginning stage of the continuing Asian revolution, a profound social and political upheaval which has drawn much of its inspiration from our own liberal revolution. It is marked by a surging tide of nationalism which is wiping out old landmarks, casting aside outworn institutions, and eliminating social inequities. In their stead, free Asia's leaders, who are struggling to build new, just, and abundant societies, are adopting and adapting many of the social, intellectual, political, and material aspects of our own democratic tradition. With energy and tenacity of purpose the free nations of the area have vastly enlarged their possibility of achieving security, stability, and progress.

Their development is menaced by the new Chinese Communist imperialism. The United States, through SEATO and other mutual defense arrangements, stands ready to help the free peoples of Asia throw back Communist aggression. But how much better if we could concentrate our efforts entirely on cooperative programs for their social and economic progress!

United States policy is designed to promote the independence of the free nations of Asia and to help them build strong and free societies. The basic purpose of this policy is to assure that the continuing Asian social revolution will not falter because of a lack of understanding or too feeble a response.

Building Mutual Understanding

Mutual understanding is being built in myriad ways. Our contacts with free Asia are wider now than at any time in the past. Our officials meet with theirs in Asia, in the United States, at the United Nations, and at scores of international councils dealing with all matters affecting our daily lives and the future of our interdependent world. Our citizens are traveling, working, and studying in Asian countries in larger numbers than ever before. Asian architecture influences our housing. Asian art and culture are under-

President Eisenhower Sends Greetings to Far East-America Council

*Message of President Eisenhower*¹

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, October 7, 1959

It is a pleasure to send my greetings to those attending the 12th Annual Far East Conference of the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry.

Throughout history, misunderstanding of the intent and capabilities of other peoples has been one of the chief causes of war. Mindful of this, the United States has in recent weeks taken new steps to increase understanding of our peaceful intent and of our determination and ability to stand fast by the principles of free men.

Lasting peace, however, is not built of understanding alone. It is reinforced by constant vigilance. In the face of existing conditions in the Far East, I want to reaffirm the constancy of our policies toward that area. I believe that developments are increasingly demonstrating the correctness of our position.

To vigilance and understanding which provide the groundwork of peace, there must be added the impetus of positive achievements. We Americans know this well and we are willing—indeed, eager—to contribute of our substance and labors, where they are wanted, in the mutual building of a better world. The endeavors and deliberations here in the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry are, I firmly believe, representative of what should be done on an ever-increasing scale—a combining of Asian and American energies and ideas on the part of private enterprises, individual citizens and governments. This is a joint effort which is filled with promise for mankind.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

¹ Read by Under Secretary Dillon before the Far East-America Council at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7 (press release 707).

stood and admired by Americans. Asian leaders are enabled to see at first hand the workings of our governmental and private institutions. Asia is no longer a far-off romantic mystery to Americans, and America is no longer a remote dream to Asians. We have mutually learned that interdependence is essential to freedom and progress.

Asian eagerness for betterment, which sometimes borders on impatience, is something you sense as you travel through the area. Last spring, while enroute to the SEATO Council meeting in New Zealand and to the United States chiefs of mission conference at Baguio in the Philippines, I could feel the electric nature of this driving force.

Although the chief purpose of calling our ambassadors to Baguio was to examine the problems of the area stemming from the menace of Communist China, we found ourselves more often discussing how we could help the Asians to help themselves. We examined the weaknesses of free Asia: the lack of capital, the problems growing out of multiplying populations, the continuing shortage of Asians skilled in the arts of government, industry, and technology. But we did so as the basis of a search for ways in which orderly progress and development could be achieved.

It was the consensus of the conference that great progress is indeed being made in free Asia but that final attainment of the aspirations of the peoples of the area could only be accomplished in an atmosphere of peace and freedom from attack.

The methods through which we and Asia work together—the mutual security program, the Development Loan Fund, trade, multilateral endeavors such as the U.N.'s ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East] and the Colombo Plan—are known to you all and have been examined in your panels during the past 2 days. By the time you convene again a year from now, it is my hope that another cooperative project will be ready to play an active part in man's historic struggle against poverty and disease. I refer to the new International Development Association, an American initiative which last week was approved in principle by the 68 member nations of the World Bank.⁶ The IDA would be truly international in character and would provide a means whereby all of the prospering nations of the free world could join in contributing to the financial needs of the newly developing areas. It merits your careful study and active support.

The Asian revolution has made an auspicious beginning, but it is only a beginning. Its continuing success will depend in no small measure upon us and upon the other economically advanced nations of the free world. We must persevere in our efforts to help strengthen the foundations of freedom in the Far East and to build upon these foundations the progress, enlightenment, and mutual relationships needed to meet communism's challenge to freedom and progress.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1959, p. 541.

Secretary Herter's News Conference of October 6

Press release 703 dated October 6

Secretary Herter: Ladies and gentlemen, there is one question that I suspect might come up during the course of this conference, and I am taking the liberty of answering it even before it is posed, and that has to do with a possible summit conference.

We have been communicating with our allies on the various subjects brought up between the President and Chairman Khrushchev at Camp David.¹ Among these is a possible summit conference. The matter of a summit conference, and when or where it might be held, is, as the President said last week, a subject for consultation with other nations. Until that process has been completed, I cannot properly say anything further.

I realize that this may be a somewhat cryptic answer—copies of it will be available²—but that is the answer to that question.

Q. Can you say, Mr. Secretary, when that process might be completed? Is it a matter of days, weeks, or months?

A. I can't tell you.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you care to sum up for us the points of value in the Khrushchev visit and discussions of the Chairman with President Eisenhower, in the way of second thoughts, since a week has elapsed since the Premier has left this country?

A. I take it that that question is on points of value. That, it seems to me, would have to be answered in two parts. First, the short-range value: I think that the meetings did have value in

easing to some degree existing tensions. I think that they had value in allowing the President and Mr. Khrushchev to get to know each other better as individuals. And I gather from such statements as have been made by Mr. Khrushchev since he left the United States that he is publicly stating that he has a very high regard for the President. I think the trip as a whole had value in that certainly Mr. Khrushchev must have seen a good many different facets of American life with which he had not previously been familiar, and undoubtedly that had its good points.

With respect to the substance of the conversations themselves, as you have been informed by the President and by the communique, the decisions, particularly with respect to Berlin, certainly have eased the question of any threat in connection with further negotiations that might be undertaken.

With respect to disarmament, which was discussed only in very general terms, as I understand it, between the President and Mr. Khrushchev, there was certainly in Mr. Khrushchev's attitude a degree of real sincerity, which, of course, has to be balanced against the proposal itself, as it was made at the United Nations, and as it has sometimes, rather skeptically I think, been termed a propaganda document.

From a long-range point of view I think it still remains to be seen how valuable the visit has been. On that score, I can only say that time will tell, but I would like to be optimistic.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your views on the present United Arab Republic position with respect to barring Israel's ships, or those ships carrying Israel commodities, through the Suez Canal, and would you favor a Middle East summit meeting between Arab and Israel leaders?

A. With respect to the first part of that question, I expressed myself, I think, very succinctly

¹ For text of a joint communique issued on Sept. 27 at the conclusion of talks between President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, see BULLETIN of Oct. 12, 1959, p. 499.

² The above paragraph was also released separately as press release 702 dated October 6.

at the United Nations.³ With respect to the second part of the question, we feel that this matter is one, of course, primarily between Israel and the U.A.R. But I am sure that we would welcome mutually acceptable direct conversations between the Egyptians and the Israelis with respect to points of issue between them.

Question of Negotiations on Berlin

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have just said that the talks at Camp David with respect to Berlin have eased the situation with respect to any threat toward future negotiations. In your speech before the United Nations, which happened before the Camp David talks, you said it was only after this threat had been withdrawn that the Western Powers agreed to negotiate in the interest of peaceful exchange.

A. Yes, the threat had been withdrawn, but only temporarily, as you may recall it. And the point we were negotiating about at the end was a temporary settlement over Berlin. And, actually, the breaking point in those discussions came when we could receive no assurances from the Russians that if negotiations were resumed, after "x" period of time, our rights would not be impaired.

Q. So that was the point on which we broke off the talks, that there existed a new threat during the Berlin talks?

A. Yes, it was made clear that they would give no assurances that, after a given period of time for a modus vivendi for Berlin, if negotiations were resumed our rights would remain unimpaired.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have spoken, of course, of the easing of tensions due to the withdrawal of the threat. Now do you have any specific information that would give you any hope that we have any more chance of reaching an agreement on Berlin and on Germany at the summit meeting than we had at the Geneva conference last summer?

A. No, I can't say that I can give you that assurance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since the Santiago conference,⁴ do you think that the Caribbean situa-

tion and the general political problems have eased enough so that the hemisphere can settle down to tackle basic economic problems again?

A. Well, I think the Santiago conference and the resolutions that came out of that, and the steps that were taken with respect to the Peace Commission were very helpful. I can judge only by the fact that, with respect to the activities in the Caribbean that had assumed somewhat alarming proportions, there has been no resumption of those activities since the Santiago conference. So that I am hopeful that that situation will continue.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] conference will meet tomorrow—the former Baghdad Pact.⁵ Can you tell us what you expect that conference to accomplish and whether the United States is planning any particular initiatives at that conference?

A. Well, as you know, this is a regularly scheduled conference of the Baghdad Pact in which we agreed to act as host here. On the agenda, as far as I know, there are no specific new matters. I think that there will be a general review of the overall situation. I think there will be a very free interchange of opinion. I am hopeful that the CENTO activities in which we have participated will be felt by the member nations to have made real progress in strengthening the area.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Secretary General of CENTO, Mr. [M. O. A.] Baig, said again the other day at a news conference that he wishes the United States would join the organization. Could you tell us at this point why the United States will not join it now, as a full member rather than as an observer?

A. Yes. That matter has been considered very carefully. We have considered our relationships with other nations of the area. We have considered domestic problems. And, on balance, we have decided that we can probably be of more assistance in maintaining tranquillity and helping to develop that area by remaining as an observer rather than as a full member.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. [Dean] Acheson said in Germany yesterday, or the day before, that Allied rights in Berlin were fundamental and, in effect, not negotiable. Can you tell us what, on the sub-

³ BULLETIN of Oct. 5, 1959, p. 467.

⁴ Ibid., Aug. 31, 1959, p. 299, and Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

⁵ See p. 581.

ject of Berlin, you think could be negotiated without compromising Allied rights?

A. No. At this stage of the game I would rather not go into the possible permutations and combinations. I think we made it pretty clear at Geneva as to what we considered were matters of principle on which we would not negotiate or not give. But from the point of view of details within that framework, I would rather not go into that. Obviously, this is a matter for consultation and not for us to advance a particular plan at this time.

Communist China

Q. *Mr. Secretary, do you see any easing of tension in the Far East as a result of Mr. Khrushchev's visit here or of his visit to Peiping?*

A. Well, it is hard to tell. I would say that I can see no visible easing of tensions as between Chinese Communists and ourselves. They repeated their statement with respect to Taiwan, and they repeated a number of times a statement with regard to the attitude of the United States—"imperialist" attitude and the "aggressive" attitude of the United States.

With respect to Mr. Khrushchev's handling of himself in Peiping, there were things of very real interest. There was no question but that he talked quite eloquently with respect to the solution of international problems by peaceful means. He indicated that it was the attitude of the Soviet Government—and he referred in that particular case to his own Government—to try to work out international problems along these lines. He clearly was not speaking for the Communist Chinese at that point.

Perhaps equally interesting was the fact that Mr. Mao [Tse-tung] never made any statement at all, either on Mr. Khrushchev's arrival or on his departure, at the time that Mr. Khrushchev made some statements at the airport, nor at any time during the conference. These matters, naturally, are difficult to evaluate, but they would seem to indicate that perhaps Mr. Khrushchev and the Soviet Government of Russia are taking a rather different line from the point of view of the solution of international problems from that of the Communist Chinese.

Q. *Under what circumstances would you consider diplomatic relations with the Communist*

regime of China? What conditions do you regard as necessary for diplomatic recognition?

A. Well, we have never laid out specific conditions. We have often enumerated, as Mr. Robertson did at the United Nations,^{*} some of the very basic difficulties that have grown up between us. The continued imprisonment contrary to signed agreement of five American citizens in China is one. The continuing overt threat to use force against Taiwan is another. The continued condemnation as an aggressor of the Chinese Communists by the United Nations is the third. I wouldn't say that that was an exclusive list, and I wouldn't want to say that we would necessarily recognize Communist China if all of those conditions were rectified, but they are among some of the very real grievances that we have and it makes us feel that it is not in our national interest to recognize the Chinese Communists at this time.

Q. *Mr. Secretary, the President suggested that Mr. Khrushchev might mention the five prisoners in China when he got there. Have we had any word about whether or not he did?*

A. No, we have had no word on that.

Disarmament

Q. *Mr. Secretary, you said that you were convinced that Mr. Khrushchev was sincere in what he said about disarmament. In the talks at Camp David did the Russians give any indication at all of what they are prepared to do on control and inspection?*

A. No, there were no detailed discussions of control and inspection. That has been the stumbling block of any successful negotiations on this subject, and nothing was said in regard to specifics in that matter.

Q. *Mr. Secretary, do you consider that the threat to Berlin, about which you were talking earlier, has now been indefinitely lifted or permanently lifted? What phrasing would you use?*

A. I presume that the word "indefinitely" is better than the word "permanently." "Indefinitely" was the word that was used in connection

^{*} BULLETIN of Oct. 12, 1959, p. 517.

with the prolongation of the conversations—that they would not be prolonged indefinitely.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in regard to the nuclear test ban negotiations, there was nothing in the communique on that subject. Was that discussed at Camp David in any detail?

A. As far as I know it was not discussed between the President and Mr. Khrushchev. It was discussed by myself with Mr. [Andrei] Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister], and no new light was shed on reaching agreement there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have said that Red China and the Soviet Union seemed to be taking a different foreign policy line. What do you see in the immediate and distant future as far as their relations are concerned? Will there be a split, or will they make up, or what is going to happen?

A. Well, I would rather not begin prophesying what is going to happen there. How deep the differences run is very difficult to gage. Certainly from the point of view of outward appearances I would imagine they would continue to indicate they are working very closely together and are good friends. I think all we can do is watch very carefully the development of their relationship and probably have to accumulate considerably more evidence before we could reach a definitive conclusion.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in their discussions at Camp David did Mr. Khrushchev exclude specifically from his agreement to forswear force in the settlement of international peace the question of Formosa or any other countries or areas which he would regard in the category of being "liberated"?

A. No, he didn't exclude any area, but, as you know from the President's press conference, he did express himself pretty strongly on the subject of Formosa.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Khrushchev insists that he never meant any threat to the Allies in Berlin in the first place. The West's conclusion is about 180 degrees opposite that. Against that background are you convinced that his interpretation of this withdrawal of threat indefinitely is the same as ours?

A. I don't think there is any difference of interpretation.

Q. Well, Mr. Secretary, do we regard the removal of the time limit in itself sufficient warrant to go to a summit meeting? Previously the President has always said there must be some indication of substantive agreement.

A. There I can only refer you to the President's own words in his press conference last week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel there might have to be a reappraisal of the Western position on Berlin and Germany if the Labor Party is victorious in the British elections?

A. I wouldn't want to speculate on that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that a plan for Berlin was worked out at Camp David. Is there any substance to that?

A. No, no plan whatever for Berlin was worked out at Camp David, nor were specifics discussed as far as I know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the U.N. today the Soviet delegate said that our support of Turkey against Poland for the Security Council's seat amounted to a manifestation of the cold war. How does this line fit with the interpretation that we understood the Khrushchev talks left here that we were going to end this cold-war talk?

A. I don't know why the backing of one candidate against another for a U.N. seat should be considered as part of the cold war. That is Mr. [A. A.] Sobolev's interpretation; it is not ours. We don't consider that a part of the cold war in any way.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have evidence of any progress being made toward a solution of the Algerian situation?

A. No, I don't think we have any information other than that which you have. I think that, of course, we are tremendously heartened by General de Gaulle's proposal, and I think that on the whole its reception and particularly the constructive and I think courageous attitude that Mr. [Habib] Bourguiba [President of Tunisia] has taken to be of assistance in this matter is most encouraging.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you put the summit question aside by your statement, does that also put aside any question of a resumption of your foreign ministers meeting or any other sub-for-

sign-ministers-level discussions among the Allies with the Soviets?

A. Well, it would, yes, because in effect the question of the summit and then of foreign ministers meetings is somewhat allied from the point of view of when and how one begins resuming negotiation.

Q. There is now, then, no timetable of any kind of any negotiation with the Soviet Union at any level? Is that correct?

A. I think I gave you my answer in the very first statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you define the American position as to its responsibility for training troops in Laos?

A. Well, as you know, we have some technicians in Laos who are working with the French, who have the responsibility for the training of the troops in Laos.

Q. Sir, is it true that we cannot train these people beyond the 30-caliber weapons?

A. I couldn't tell you what the limitation is on weapons. The Geneva accord, I think, has restricted the army in size and in weapons to what was required for internal purposes, and I can't tell you just what the caliber of the restrictions might have been.

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, regarding weapons, the West Germans to date have purposely avoided buying the big rockets, the big IRBM's. They have stuck to the purchase of small defensive weapons. Do you think this restraint is wise, or do you think they ought to build up and we should cooperate with them in sending IRBM's to West Germany?

A. That I would rather not say is wise or unwise. I assume what they are doing is in accordance with the NATO decision as to what presents the best balanced type of defensive posture in Europe.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if we can't talk about the summit conference, there is another type of meeting that the Foreign Minister of Colombia [Julio Cesar Turbay] proposed to you a week ago, namely, that the hemisphere foreign ministers meet each year shortly in advance of the U.N. General Assembly. Do you have any comment on that?

A. No, I think it's something that should certainly be explored. They have ministerial meetings, of course, on a regular basis every 5 years, and then they can be called in consultation whenever any situation would make that a desirable thing. Whether they should hold a regular annual meeting or not is something that I imagine they will discuss among themselves at the Quito conference in February.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I might return to what you said about Israel and the U.A.R., has there been any development in the Middle East that would lead you to suppose that a conversation, a direct conversation, between Israel and the U.A.R. might be possible?

A. I have no knowledge of any. What happened at the United Nations, the offer that was made by Israel to undertake discussions at any time with the U.A.R., free from any prearranged condition, at least raises the question anew. Whether it is going to be possible to reach agreement for that type of discussion, I don't know. I merely said that, if they could reach agreement and could get into that kind of discussion, we would welcome it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any timetable for bilateral negotiations with the Russians, such as the lend-lease matter?*¹

A. No, no timetable.

Definition of Threat to Berlin

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you spell out a little bit more in detail what you mean when say the Camp David talks eased the threat to Berlin, and particularly would you define what the threat to Berlin is, or was?

A. Well, the threat to Berlin, as it was stated and has been restated on several occasions, was that the Russians would draw up a peace treaty with the East Germans and would transfer to the East Germans all the rights of sovereignty in the routes of access to Berlin; that thereafter the obligations which the Russians undertook to maintain the open communications for the people of West Berlin, whether they were persons or goods or

¹ For background, see the transcript of Under Secretary Dillon's news conference of Sept. 30, *ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1959, p. 547.

communications, would then be transferred to the East Germans. But if we made any move to maintain our own rights as against the East Germans, the Russians would then support the East Germans. That was the threat that was made.

*Q. That goes back to November of last year.**

A. That's right.

Q. But the Soviet position still is, I believe, that the West should get out of Berlin. So in that respect, I suppose the threat to Berlin remains?

A. The Russian position, as I understand it, is that the occupation status of our troops in Berlin should not be perpetuated forever.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if we can try once more on the question of negotiations for a summit conference, do you expect these to bear any fruit before the President's return visit to the Soviet Union next year?

A. Oh, I couldn't tell you on that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there seems to have been a backing away from saying, since the Camp David talks, that occupation troops would remain in Berlin until the reunification of Germany.

A. There has been no change.

Q. Has there been a change in that position?

A. No.

Q. Do we intend to maintain occupation troops, the Western Powers, in Berlin until the reunification is accomplished?

A. That is the position we have taken, and we see no reason to move away from it.

Soviet Responsibility as Leader of Communist World

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you reconcile what you said about the possibility of a split between Russia and China on foreign policy and the statement by the Chinese or the communique at the end of Khrushchev's visit there that they acknowledge Khrushchev as head of the Communist world?

A. Well, that was a very difficult one to explain. There is no question in our mind that that demand for recognition as the leader of the Communist world places upon the Russians a degree

* For text of the Soviet note of Nov. 27 and the U.S. reply, see *ibid.*, Jan. 19, 1959, p. 79.

of responsibility for the actions of other members of the bloc that is very real.

Q. Mr. Secretary, before Mr. Khrushchev came to this country, he seemed to be represented as being almost obsessed with the need of such a visit and a summit conference. Since he has achieved this visit, do we have any indication that his insistence on a summit conference has eased?

A. No, I wouldn't say that it has eased. I think he has always wanted a summit conference. I think that the President made it very clear that as a result of what happened at Camp David some of the real objections that he had to holding a summit conference have been removed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that this Soviet leadership posture in the Communist bloc placed a degree of responsibility on the Russians in the actions of other members of the bloc. Was that point made to Mr. Khrushchev by the President during the talks?

A. I think it has been made a number of times. I think Mr. Khrushchev appreciates the fact that we feel that they have a great degree of responsibility for the actions of other members of the bloc.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any inconsistency in your statement just a few moments ago that we have not separated the Berlin issue from the whole issue of German reunification and President Eisenhower's statement at his last news conference that the Berlin situation was an abnormal situation?

A. There is nothing inconsistent in that. Mr. Couve de Murville, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, and I all agreed in Geneva that it was an abnormal situation, that it was abnormal in that you still had occupation troops after a period of 14 years, that likewise it was a free city surrounded by an inimical Communist group and that was an abnormal situation. We have never denied that for a moment.

Q. Has it not been our position though that it was abnormal because the division of Germany was abnormal?

A. We have certainly taken that position.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we can get this Berlin thing a little clearer. You have defined

the threat to Berlin and then you have defined our position and you said the Russians have withdrawn the threat. Have they said they will not now withdraw their troops and hand over authority? Or just what is the situation? Or did they just postpone the threat?

A. What they have said is that they put no time limit on the negotiations, which in effect meant that there would be no unilateral action on their part, while the negotiations are continuing.

Q. But this is still their goal, to hand it over to the East Germans?

A. It is very much their goal. In fact, there was a message from Mr. Khrushchev to the East Germans sent, I think today, congratulating them on the valiant stand that they are making to get rid of the occupation forces in Berlin.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were you saying, in effect, to

Mr. [Chalmers] Roberts, a minute ago, that we would hold Russia responsible for the action of other Communist nations? Was that the effect of your remark to him, sir?

A. To a degree they are responsible, as long as they are maintaining this position of being the leader in the bloc and insisting, as they seem to have each time they go to China, that the Chinese recognize that leadership.

Q. Do you mean by that, sir, that in the view of American policy the Soviet Government has some responsibility for China's action toward Korea, or Formosa, or Laos, specific places of that kind?

A. A degree of responsibility, as long as they maintain that they are the leaders of the bloc.

Q. Thank you, sir.

Central Treaty Organization Holds Ministerial Meeting at Washington

The seventh session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization (formerly the Baghdad Pact) was held at Washington, D.C., October 7-9. Following are texts of the welcoming remarks made by Vice President Nixon on October 7, a statement made by Secretary Herter at the opening meeting, the final communique, and a declaration on the Communist propaganda campaign against Iran, together with a list of the U.S. observer delegation.

REMARKS BY VICE PRESIDENT NIXON

It is a very great pleasure for me to welcome to Washington the distinguished representatives of the states of the Central Treaty Organization.¹ And not only is it a pleasure in my official position but also because my wife and I have had the privilege of visiting each of the countries who are

represented in this meeting today and of being warmly received as the representatives of the people and the Government of the United States, and therefore I welcome the opportunity to extend our greetings to you on this occasion. To you, Mr. Secretary General [M.O.A. Baig], and the members of your staff, we extend an equally warm welcome.

The people and the Government of the United States are pleased that the first meeting of the CENTO Council under its new name is here in our Nation's capital.

Development of Collective Security

Twice in our century mankind has suffered the devastating scourge of global war. In the wake of the physical and moral desolation that is inevitably its aftermath we have had cause to reflect upon its futility. It has spurred our search for more constructive ways in resolving international disputes.

The close of World War II saw the establishment of the United Nations, which kindled our

¹ CENTO is an alliance between Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The United States, which participates in various CENTO activities, was represented by an observer delegation headed by Secretary Herter.

hopes that a new era of human understanding had begun. Then, as now, we hope this era will be one in which international society could make peacefully and with justice those adjustments required of it by the steady course of human progress. Thus the thousands of those who follow in our footsteps will enjoy to the fullest our God-given privilege of life and God-given opportunities free from fear. But peace, we have learned through long experience, cannot be taken for granted; to be maintained it must be waged vigorously, unceasingly, and courageously, and the responsibility for doing so rests with all free nations, each in accordance with its capability. Indeed, the awesome nature of modern technological developments has thrust upon us the consciousness of interdependence of nations as never before in human history.

The years since World War II have regrettably been marked by the continuous probing by international communism to impose its ideology and its domination on others. Free men and nations have had to meet this challenge everywhere. Many have responded to it by unifying their individual attempts in a single large effort. This is the genesis of collective security throughout the world. It is defensive in nature, it has been bred of an imperative need, and collective security requires sacrifice. It is no panacea for all problems. Yet it provides a firm foundation of combined strength which benefits us all. Further, it constitutes a solid basis from which we can fearlessly continue our never-ending efforts to resolve equitably and with firmness free-world differences with the Communist bloc.

The Central Treaty Organization, together with its sister organizations, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] in Europe and SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] in southeast Asia, are significant manifestations of this regional collective assumption of responsibility to wage peace.

May I say in that connection that in view of recent world developments perhaps there might be in some quarters a tendency to suggest that we might relax our efforts among our various collective treaty organizations in view of the change in the world situation that some may seek. I think, as our Secretary of State pointed out very effectively in his press conference yesterday [October

6],² it is at least hopeful at the present time that we may have opened the road to negotiations on the question of Berlin. But, as he also pointed out, we must not have any illusions; as far as the basic differences are concerned—the positions that are taken—they remain the same as they were. And, as the Secretary General pointed out in his remarks this morning, the greater danger to independence, to freedom, which exists in many parts of the world, and particularly in the nations represented here, is not aggression across borders, but it is aggression which in effect goes beneath, through subversion, attempting to subvert the freely chosen governments which are involved.

Peaceful Competition

We hear a great deal about peaceful competition these days. We all welcome it, certainly, all the nations that are members of CENTO. We in the United States, in addition, welcome peaceful competition, but we also realize that if competition is to remain peaceful there must be rules of the game which all will follow. It must be fair, and there cannot be one set of rules by some and another set of rules by others.

In that connection we must also bear in mind that it is not enough to say that we rule out the use of force across the border and that competition thereby becomes peaceful, because the kind of subversion that has been described by the Secretary General here today certainly would endanger the concept of peaceful competition which we would all welcome in the event that we could agree to rules which we are to follow. CENTO has already played an important role in the rules to be followed. It forges new links of friendship among the nations of the world. Similarly it has established the basis of partnership between those nations and their Western friends, based on a mutual respect and complete equality.

Despite the natural differences of views and opinions which understandably arise on occasion among friends, CENTO stands today stronger than ever, and the American people recognize fully this is a reflection of the determination of its members to be and to remain free and independent. It is in this spirit of deep appreciation and complete confidence that the United States—our Govern-

² See p. 575.

ment, our people—welcomes the Council here today.

The United States has been closely associated with CENTO since its beginning almost 5 years ago. We have contributed materially and morally to strengthening the CENTO states' postures and to improving their economic capabilities, and may I emphasize, what I know you realize, that this has been done entirely without strings. Our interest in this program, in all of those in which we are engaged around the world, is to stand for the very independence which we have ourselves, and we want, as far as other nations are concerned, only the same opportunity that we have to remain independent, our people to be free.

I assure you that the United States will continue to support CENTO through all feasible and appropriate means. The American people will watch the Council's deliberations during these next few days with keen interest, and we are confident they will be crowned with success. You may be assured we will do our part to make it so. And when they have been concluded you also can be sure that you, each of you, will carry home with you the esteem, the good wishes, and the warm affection of the American people.

Thank you very much.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY HERTER

Press release 704 dated October 7

I join with Vice President Nixon in warmly welcoming to Washington this distinguished gathering of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization. The Government of the United States, though an observer in CENTO, is pleased to be host to this session. Your presence here today is further attestation of the readiness of the United States to continue to give strong support to CENTO and its programs. It is also a source of deep personal satisfaction to me to have the opportunity to acquaint myself at first hand with the work of the CENTO association.

The United States has long enjoyed close relations with the several CENTO member states. Those with the United Kingdom are well known and require no elaboration here. There is perhaps less awareness of our valued relations with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. It seems appropriate, there-

fore, to dwell briefly on these relations. Growing out of many decades of mutually beneficial association between the peoples of these countries and private American citizens—businessmen, educators, doctors, missionaries, and others—they were forged to a new firmness in the difficult years which followed World War II. It was during this period, too, that Pakistan took its place as a respected member of the family of independent nations. Since that time, these three nations have been making great strides forward in developing themselves.

True to its traditions the United States wholeheartedly sympathized with these aspirations. Further, it lent moral and material aid to make their achievement possible. It has continued to do so. United States economic and military assistance programs to Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have been substantial. Thus, for example, United States economic aid to these three countries in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958, totaled approximately \$300 million. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959, it amounted to approximately \$470 million—an increase of more than 50 percent.

The United States firmly believes that its aid programs have contributed materially to the strengthening of these three countries. These programs are developed in close consultation with the recipient states. They are not imposed. To the extent that appropriations and its other global commitments allow, the United States will continue to assist Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in promoting their security and their economic development.

Flowing from all of this has been a growing affinity of interest between the United States and these countries and a greater understanding of each other's problems. Differences of emphasis occasionally arise. This is understandable even among friends. What is significant, however, is that the mutual trust which has developed between us enables any such differences to be resolved quickly and to our common satisfaction.

U.S. Association With CENTO

United States association with CENTO is yet another link in the chain of friendship which binds us to these states. It is an important link. It complements those close and valued direct re-

lations to which I have already referred. It has its origins in the recognition of the fact that at least some of our common objectives might usefully be furthered by peaceful collective effort as well as individual endeavor. The promotion and strengthening of peace and freedom throughout the world, the fostering of a respect for the dignity of the individual, the maintenance of national independence, and finally the creation of greater opportunities for the individual to improve his way of life—all of these transcend the relations between any two states and are rightly a shared concern of the family of nations. Collective security arrangements such as CENTO contribute materially toward achieving those objectives.

United States support of CENTO, both moral and material, has been given since the Organization was conceived almost 5 years ago. This support has not wavered. The United States participates actively in CENTO defense planning designed to assist the CENTO members to resist any Communist attempt to undermine their security and independence. Supplementing its massive bilateral assistance to the regional states, the United States supports CENTO's multilateral economic programs and is actively engaged in implementing various CENTO-endorsed projects.³ These are designed to further the concept of regionalism. Chief among them is the microwave telecommunications project which will link the three capitals of the regional states. When completed—and construction work is expected to begin later this year—this will be the longest single telecommunications network in the world.

Clearly, the United States cannot underwrite all CENTO economic projects. Indeed, it has honest doubts about the economic potential of some proposals. It will continue, however, to explore with the CENTO member states ways and means in which the United States may be able to help in this very important aspect of CENTO activities.

The bilateral executive agreements with the regional states were consummated earlier this year.⁴ These agreements reaffirmed the deter-

mination of the United States to continue the economic and military aid programs to these countries. Further, they assure United States support in case of Communist aggression. The agreements were developed in the context of existing congressional legislation, specifically the joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East and the Mutual Security Act. The United States firmly believes they go far toward meeting the acknowledged security requirements of the CENTO regional states. Moreover, they provide a suitable framework in which the United States can pursue its strong support of CENTO objectives.

These agreements are public documents. So is the CENTO treaty. They were concluded in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter and support its purposes and principles. They are registered with the United Nations. Thus it is clear for all to see—who wish to see—that CENTO and United States association with it are purely defensive arrangements. They threaten no one. Their cardinal purpose is to deter aggression by strengthening the defensive capabilities of its members and by promoting their sound economic development in the interests of political stability.

Achievements of CENTO

CENTO has now been in existence for almost 5 years. Yet there are some who still profess to deny its significance. It may be appropriate, therefore, to pause for a moment and consider its achievements to date.

First, CENTO stands today as a symbol of the determination of its members to maintain their independence and of their unshakable belief that this can best be achieved through collective security.

Second, CENTO is a partnership which includes three of the great states of the Middle East region. The scope of this partnership is broad. It includes defense cooperation but also embraces political, economic, and cultural association. It is implemented through various media. Some, such as joint military exercises, attract the public eye through press comment. Others, while no less significant, have been pursued more quietly and are perhaps less well known. These are the

³ For a U.S. statement before the CENTO Economic Committee on Sept. 1, see BULLETIN of Oct. 5, 1959, p. 487.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 23, 1959, p. 417.

numerous technical meetings at all levels, the active CENTO technical assistance program, joint efforts to relax visa restrictions among the regional states, trade promotion, the prevention of smuggling, and the many other spheres of constructive endeavor that CENTO has fostered. All contribute to the cross-fertilization of ideas. Thus, the effect of CENTO activities extends beyond formal governmental exchange. Its benefits seep down, gradually but surely, to the people as well. The United States is confident that from this association will develop a wider public understanding of common problems and of the very real value of sharing experience. The seed of close partnership has been sown. The roots have taken hold. It will require care and attention. If these are given, it promises to flourish even more fully in the years ahead.

Third, it has provided the framework for Western cooperation with the regional states. This cooperation is not based on outmoded concepts of foreign domination. Rather it is based on the twin pillars of mutual respect and complete equality among states. Its objective is simple—the maintenance of peace and justice.

The United States is convinced that CENTO has made good and sound progress. Some, to be sure, would like to accelerate the pace of CENTO activity. This deserves to be encouraged, for such impatience is a healthy phenomenon. Indeed, it is a spur to further accomplishment. Much constructive work remains to be done, but no one will forget the long road that the CENTO partnership has already traveled. With mutual confidence and common effort by all, CENTO can achieve its objectives. It will increasingly benefit the peoples whom it serves in the promotion of peace and stability. In this laudable endeavor, I repeat to you here, CENTO will continue to enjoy strong United States support.

Gentlemen, the United States observer delegation looks forward to participating in the deliberations of this conference and to making a constructive contribution to them.

Thank you.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The Seventh Session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization was held in Washington

from October 7-9, 1959. The delegations from countries participating in this meeting were led by:

- | | |
|---|---|
| (i) H. E. Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal | Prime Minister of Iran |
| (ii) H. E. Mr. Manzur Qadir | Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Pakistan |
| (iii) H. E. Mr. Adnan Menderes | Prime Minister of Turkey |
| (iv) H. E. Sir Harold Caccia,
G. C. M. G., K. C. V. O. | Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to the United States |
| (v) The Hon. Christian A. Herter | Secretary of State, United States of America. |

Secretary Herter, as host, was in the chair.

The Session was inaugurated by the Honourable Richard M. Nixon, Vice President of the United States.

The Council recognized that the holding of a Ministerial Meeting in Washington for the first time was an open expression of the importance attached to the Central Treaty Organization by the United States Government and the American people and of the vital role of the United States in strengthening the efforts of the member States to guard their freedom by collective security. The Council welcomed the conclusion of bilateral agreements last March between the United States and the regional members. They noted with gratification the determination of the United States to assist the signatory nations to maintain their security and independence while simultaneously contributing to the enhancement of their economic potential.

This meeting of the Ministerial Council was the first to take place under the new name of the Organization. The name, Central Treaty Organization, signifies that the countries occupying a central area between the NATO and SEATO regions have confirmed their decision to join together for mutual defence and economic development.

In keeping with the tradition of free and frank expression of views at all its meetings, the Council conducted a review of the international situation as it affects the participating States.

The Council believed that the exchanges of visits between Western and Russian statesmen had brought nearer the possibility of reducing some of the tension of the cold war by re-opening negotiations on Berlin and disarmament. On the other hand there remain deep-seated causes of anxiety, and Communist activities continue unabated. The danger of subversion abetted by foreign propaganda, for instance, remains particularly acute. The members of CENTO are especially exposed to this danger because of their geographical position at one of the cross-roads of the world. The Council noted with concern the continuance of Soviet propaganda against Iran, and they have issued a separate declaration on this subject. The Council concluded that it was only by the exercise of constant vigilance, maintenance of their strength, and by solidarity with one another that they could hope to guard against these dangers and promote the reduction of international tension.

The Council emphasized that the Central Treaty Organization exists exclusively for defensive purposes,

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that it threatens no one, and that it sincerely desires to have close and friendly relations with all other States, and particularly with the neighbouring States in the Region.

The establishment of a Permanent Military Deputies Group, to begin operation on January 1st, 1960, with headquarters in Ankara, was viewed by the Council as a further step by the CENTO countries to provide for their security and defence. The Council directed that the question of Command Structure be studied by the Military Committee and the results of its study be placed before the Council at its next meeting.

The Council reviewed the work of the Central Treaty Organization since the last Session of the Ministerial Council in Karachi in January 1959,⁴ and adopted the Reports of the Secretary General and the various Committees.

The opening of the Nuclear Centre in Tehran in June last by His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran and the commencement of courses for regional scientists in the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes in fields such as agriculture, medicine and industry, were noted with satisfaction.

The Council recognised that considerable progress had been made in the fields of bilateral and multilateral technical assistance. Increasingly effective use was being made of experts, fellowships and special equipment to meet common problems.

The construction of the modern microwave telecommunications link between regional capitals which began recently was noted by the Council with satisfaction. The Council gave its approval to three new Joint Projects, put forward by the Economic Committee—the Cizre-Hakkari-Shivelan road and the development of the Ports of Iskenderun and Trabzon.

The Council decided to hold its next Session in Tehran about the end of April 1960.

DECLARATION ON PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAN

The Council have considered the propaganda campaign being conducted by the Communist bloc against Iran.

Since the last meeting of the Council this campaign has been greatly intensified, particularly in the field of radio broadcasting, and is still continuing. Communist broadcasts in Persian, for example, which now total 74 hours weekly, contain a high proportion of attacks against the Iranian Government. Overt Communist broadcasts have been supplemented by a clandestine station—calling itself "The National Voice of Iran" and broadcasting in Persian. It purports to operate from within Iran but is in fact located within Soviet territory in the Caucasus. This station is broadcasting particularly violent and abusive programmes which have not only included direct appeals to the Iranian people to overthrow their government, but

⁴ *Ibid.*, Mar. 2, 1959, p. 318.

have violated the most elementary canons of international usage by making personal attacks on the Head of State.

The Council condemn this propaganda, which is markedly at variance with current efforts to reduce world tension. They express the hope that those responsible will in future comply with the Resolution adopted unanimously by the General Assembly of the United Nations on August 21, 1958, concerning non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.⁵

The Council express their admiration for the dignity and determination shown by his Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah, the Iranian Government and people in standing firm and united in the face of these attacks.

U.S. OBSERVER DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on October 5 (press release 696) that Secretary of State Christian A. Herter would be the U.S. Observer to the meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization scheduled to be held at Washington, D.C., October 7-9. Following is a list of the other members of the delegation.

Alternate U.S. Observers

Robert Murphy, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

Senior Advisers

Leland Barrows, Regional Director for Near East and South Asia Operations, International Cooperation Administration

Andrew H. Berding, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

G. Lewis Jones, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Harold Kehm, Department of State

Donald D. Kennedy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Robert H. Knight, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Jason Paige, Department of State

G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor of the Department of State

Lt. Gen. Elmer J. Rogers, United States Air Force

Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning

Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Fletcher Warren, Ambassador to Turkey and Council Deputy

William H. Weathersby, Deputy Assistant Director (Near East, South Asia and Africa), U.S. Information Agency.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1958, p. 411.

President Eisenhower Talks With Prime Minister of Iran

White House press release dated October 9

The President today [October 9] had the pleasure of meeting with Prime Minister [Manuchehr] Eshgar of Iran, who represented his country at the Central Treaty Organization meeting which has just terminated.¹ There was a very useful and interesting discussion concerning matters of mutual interest.

The President told the Prime Minister that Iran's courageous and unyielding stand in the face of the intensive and unwarranted propaganda attacks of recent months has evoked the admiration of all free nations. The President reaffirmed United States support for the collective efforts of Iran and other free nations to maintain their independence. In stressing the gravity with which the United States would view a threat to the territorial integrity and political independence of Iran, the President recalled the provisions of the bilateral agreement of cooperation with Iran² and the joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East.³

Development Loans

Iran

The United States and Iran signed on October 7 at Washington, D.C., an agreement under which the Development Loan Fund will lend \$25 million to Iran to assist in financing the construction of 369 miles of highway in that country. For details, see Department of State press release 708 dated October 7.

¹ See p. 581.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1959, p. 416.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1957, p. 481.

President Designates U.S. Members of Permanent Court of Arbitration

The Department of State announced on October 5 (press release 698) that the President had designated Bethuel Matthew Webster and Harold Armstrong Smith as members, on the part of the United States of America, of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. They replace Thomas K. Finletter and Adrian S. Fisher, whose terms have expired.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration was established under the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899 and 1907. The Permanent Court, which has its seat at The Hague, was organized "with the object of facilitating an immediate recourse to arbitration for international differences which it has not been possible to settle by diplomacy." Pursuant to the provisions of the two conventions each signatory power is directed to select four persons as arbitrators. The persons selected are inscribed as members of the Permanent Court in a list which is notified to all the contracting powers. It is further provided in the two conventions that, when any contracting powers desire to have recourse to the Court for the settlement of a difference that has arisen between them, the arbitrators called upon to form the competent tribunal to decide the difference must be chosen from the general list of the members of the Court.

The members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration also carry out the function, pursuant to the statute of the International Court of Justice, of making nominations of persons for election by the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council as members of the International Court of Justice.

The members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration are designated for terms of 6 years. The other two members of the U.S. national group on the Court are Herman Phleger and David W. Peck.

Prospects for Forthcoming Negotiations on Major World Issues

by Deputy Under Secretary Merchant¹

Nearly 4 years ago Secretary of State Dulles addressed another distinguished Philadelphia audience at a moment of unusual significance.² It was on February 26, 1956, the day after Mr. Khrushchev delivered his speech in Moscow to the 20th Party Congress attacking the cult of the individual which had grown up around Joseph Stalin. The reputation of one individual was destroyed. Today another personality seems to have taken his place.

I think we might keep this event in mind as we turn our attention to recent events and to the individual role played by this leader of the Soviet people who, in the last few weeks, has crossed the breadth of our land³ and that of Communist China as well. This is carrying personal diplomacy to extraordinary limits. It is also a demonstration of stamina which compels admiration.

A natural question is, what of Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States? We have certainly seen the agile, self-confident, calculated performance of a virtuoso, a master of the earthy aphorism. Much of his public talk has been incisive and stimulating. It has been good for all of us to have seen at close hand this formidable man and to study his reactions. If we are left unimpressed by his interpretation of history, past and future,

we must admit respect for Soviet accomplishments in the economic, technological, and cultural fields.

In competitive coexistence the Soviet Union under his leadership is a redoubtable opponent. For any who doubted this, Mr. Khrushchev's visit has applied a wholesome corrective.

Apart from such an assessment, one turns to a consideration of what tangible or substantive result has accrued—and what may the immediate future hold. A significant result coming from the Camp David talks was, I think, the removal of the immediate threat which since last November has hung over Berlin and the Western position there. The Soviet Government then informed the British, the French, and ourselves that unless we accepted its proposal, which called for the termination of the occupation regime, the Soviet Government would sign a separate peace treaty with the East Germans and transfer to them control of the access routes to Berlin from the west.⁴ This meant the abandonment of the obligations to us for free access which the Soviets had first assumed at the end of the war and subsequently reaffirmed. The Soviets said moreover that, if we made any move to maintain our rights of access and the East Germans opposed such an effort, then the Soviets would support the East Germans.

This created a dangerous and difficult problem. We—the British, the French, and ourselves—are in Berlin by right, as the Soviet Government acknowledged during the course of the Geneva conference last summer. But more is involved here than the question of legal rights. There is the question of people—more than 2 million stout-

¹ Address made before the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia at Philadelphia, Pa., on Oct. 9 (press release 712).

² BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 363.

³ Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., visited the United States Sept. 15-27. For statements made at the time of his arrival see *ibid.*, Oct. 5, 1959, p. 476; for text of communique issued at the conclusion of his talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David, see *ibid.*, Oct. 12, 1959, p. 499.

⁴ For text of Soviet note on Berlin and U.S. reply, see *ibid.*, Jan. 19, 1959, p. 79.

hearted, free people living in West Berlin. Our presence in Berlin, which started as an occupation based on rights of conquest, has in reality been transformed by time and the expressed wishes of the free people of Berlin into what is really a protective role. In the West Berlin election of December 1958 over 98 percent of the voters supported candidates and programs approving continued Allied presence. They rely on us for their future, and we will not disappoint them.

This problem—and we must remember that it is a problem artificially created by the Soviets a year ago—is a difficult and a dangerous one. The negotiation will now be resumed in a more hopeful atmosphere.

Importance of Personal Diplomacy

In stressing by the example of Berlin the difficulty of the problems for which peaceful solutions must be found, I do not wish to appear to deprecate the importance of personal diplomacy. It is important. In fact, to a substantial degree all diplomacy is personal. In the last analysis it concerns itself with people. It involves face-to-face discussion and negotiation. We must remember that negotiations only appear to deal with abstractions such as "power" or "sovereignty" or "legal rights." Negotiations in simple fact deal with people, their land and their property, the sea and air around them, and the urge and inspiration that come from history, tradition, religion, and all their hopes and fears. Diplomacy, then, is dealing with people and their problems.

Face-to-face encounters between leaders can perform a very useful purpose. They can dispel misconceptions. Sounder judgments can be formed of the other's intentions and the factors which motivate his attitudes. In this sense such meetings can reduce the risk of miscalculation.

Of and by itself, however, meetings at what Sir Winston Churchill called the summit cannot be expected to solve problems in all the infinite and complex detail which surround them. Even a meeting of minds on a main issue still leaves the need for long and difficult negotiation.

Moreover, on the side of the free world the power of even the most popular leaders is not absolute as it once was with kings and potentates. Public opinion in democracies must be developed and led. It cannot be dictated to.

Consequently the most important contribution, it seems to me, that can flow from meetings of heads of government is a change in atmosphere and a resultant improvement in the environment in which the negotiation of specific agreements can take place. That, it was hoped, would be the lasting result of the summit conference at Geneva in 1955, though unhappily the subsequent resort to detailed negotiations produced no agreements.

Mr. Khrushchev has come to America and gone. He has learned something of us and we of him, which is all to the good. The President next spring will return his visit, and in the intervening months a vista of negotiations is opened up.

Expansive Vista of Negotiations

This vista is an expansive one. The General Assembly of the United Nations is now in session. Here is a forum for useful debate and for the exchange of views on many topics, none more important than disarmament, which figured in the President's Camp David talks with Mr. Khrushchev.

Then early next year the Committee of Ten, composed of representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, and Rumania, will come together for more detailed and intensive discussions of what the President and Mr. Khrushchev described as the most important question facing the world today—disarmament. This Committee, you will recall, was established by agreement among the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France, and the United States a month or so ago⁵ as a result of discussions last summer in Geneva with the Soviet Foreign Minister concerning the importance of resuming serious talks after a lapse of nearly 2 years.

One of the proposals which the Committee of Ten will no doubt consider was that offered by Mr. Khrushchev last month in his speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations.⁶ It

⁵ For text of the Four Power communique on disarmament negotiations, see *ibid.*, Sept. 28, 1959, p. 438.

⁶ For text of the "Declaration of the Soviet Government on general and complete disarmament" submitted by Mr. Khrushchev on Sept. 18, 1959, see U.N. doc. A/4219. For a statement by Secretary Herter on the Soviet proposal, see BULLETIN of Oct. 12, 1959, p. 508.

was a proposal for general and complete disarmament. The problem of modern arms—their destructiveness and the economic burden which their manufacture and maintenance impose—is too deadly serious a subject for all humanity to fail to consider soberly and seriously every proposition responsibly put forward.

It is conceivable that a radical rather than a cautious approach will prove the key to the solution of this universal problem. As realists, however, we must recognize that, apart from the technical difficulties, which are enormous, the rock on which past efforts to reduce armaments have foundered has been the question of inspection and control. The Soviet passion for secrecy has apparently been responsible for their refusal in the past to consider the acceptance of any system of verification, which to us is a *sine qua non*. Where mutual trust and confidence are lacking and when one is dealing with the question of national survival, the safeguard of inspection and control is indispensable. Hence, in examining and discussing the Soviet proposal, this is an essential aspect which we still will want to explore.

In anticipation of the resumption of serious negotiations on the reduction and control of armaments, the United States Government has been intensively reexamining the problem and reviewing its past positions. We will also be in consultation with our participating allies, who, like ourselves, approach this forthcoming negotiation with all the seriousness which it deserves.

Meanwhile the more specialized but nevertheless important negotiation between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and ourselves on the matter of the suspension of nuclear testing will resume in Geneva on October 27, after a recess of some weeks. In this conference we have hope that a properly safeguarded agreement can be reached which at a minimum will result in the cessation of nuclear tests in the earth's atmosphere. If even such a limited success can be attained, then one can rightfully believe that the way has been opened for even more important agreements with the Soviet Union on even more important matters.

Then, too, I think it a fair speculation that the long-talked-of summit conference can be arranged in the interval before the President's return visit to the Soviet Union. This is a matter for discussion and consultation with our allies, for such con-

ferences cannot be held impromptu or lacking the necessary preparation.

This prospect of successive and in some cases overlapping conferences is good. Long lapses without talk can serve to harden differences and render more difficult arrival at agreement. I remember well the opening atmosphere of the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers in January 1954. To say the least, it was cool. In part at least I think that atmosphere was attributable to the fact that the Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States had last met in June of 1949. That particular conference at Berlin brought no result other than what communiques traditionally describe as "a better understanding of each side's point of view." Nevertheless it reestablished contact. It also played some small role, I think, in the conclusion of the Austrian treaty 15 months later, for the negotiation of that treaty was one of the items on the Berlin conference's agenda.

Now talk and negotiation are good and necessary. They cannot automatically produce agreement, and our hopes for the procession of negotiation I have listed should not be excessive. Meetings at the highest level can promote better understanding, and, as I have suggested earlier, they can produce for a while at least a better atmosphere in which to sit down around a table and seek agreement. But atmosphere and a green baize table cannot of themselves breed agreement. Profession means nothing unless performance follows.

Issues Dividing the U.S. From the U.S.S.R.

We would be blind not to recognize the magnitude and the number of the issues which divide the United States and its allies from the Soviet Union and its satellites.

One does not have to look far nor deep to realize that in Europe alone problems exist on which it has been impossible in the last 10 or 15 years to reach agreement with the Soviet Government. There are the peoples of former independent states who, since the war, have had governments forced on them with no opportunity to express their own desires. And we have watched with a deep sense of tragedy the brutal repression which followed the effort 3 years ago of the Hungarian people to establish a government of their own choosing. We of America, who have drawn so many of our

own citizens from that part of the world, have an especial understanding and sympathy for the aspirations of all those peoples.

Then there is the problem of a divided Germany and, in the heart of the eastern part of that country, a divided city—Berlin—one-third Communist controlled and two-thirds free. The reunification of Germany in freedom has been since the end of the war the unswerving objective of this country. It remains so. To keep Germany separated in two parts is an injustice which we cannot condone. We have negotiated literally for years with the Soviet Government to achieve reunification, most recently for 10 long weeks at Geneva last summer.

I do not need to remind you of the far-reaching proposals the Western Powers put forward at that time. The Western peace plan⁷ provided for staged processes in the reunification of Germany with free elections at an appropriate point and with detailed security and disarmament provisions which the United States and its allies honestly believe took fairly and fully into account any concern the Soviet Union might feel over a united Germany. A free choice was provided in the peace plan for the all-German government to adhere to either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Whatever the choice were to be, the peace plan contemplated special measures covering the disposition of forces and the location of installations in the area closest to the frontier between a united Germany and countries which were members of another security pact. Moreover, there was provision for agreements between the Four Powers and other European countries concerning joint reaction against any aggression.

I have sketched only the highlights of this carefully worked out, detailed plan to indicate its reasonableness and the added security which its acceptance would bring to the heart of Europe. Unfortunately it was not accepted by the Soviet delegation at Geneva. In fact, we were left with the impression that the Soviet delegation pushed it aside without real study. This rejection forced the Geneva conference to turn to a discussion of Berlin, the status of which the Soviet Union had so suddenly announced last November to be intolerable. Obviously the logical and proper solution for a divided Berlin lies in the reunification

of Germany. Berlin would then be restored to its proper place as the capital of the reunited country.

The Western Allies advanced proposals for a temporary agreement which, without impairment to our rights or risk to the freedom of over 2 million West Berliners who rely on our presence as protection, would by the exercise of reciprocal restraints have met the asserted concern of the Soviets. But no such *modus vivendi* was agreed upon at Geneva.

As a result of the Camp David talks, negotiations on Germany and Berlin will be resumed with no fixed time limit to their duration and therefore in a more hopeful atmosphere, free from threat. They will resume, however, with no purpose on our part to permit our rights to be impaired or the freedom and security of the West Berliners, which we are pledged to defend, to be placed in jeopardy.

Mr. Khrushchev subscribed at Camp David to the tenet which we have always held that disputes must be settled by negotiation, not force, and change achieved exclusively by peaceful means. The test and the final value of Mr. Khrushchev's visit will now await the outcome of negotiations in train or in prospect. The issues are difficult, and the process will no doubt be prolonged. We for our part enter hopefully but watchfully on this process, prepared to negotiate in good faith but without surrender of principle or acceptance of hurt to our national interests or the interests of our friends and allies.

Qualities Needed in the Future

We are entitled to some hope that we are entering a period where change when needed can in fact be achieved by peaceful means and not by force or the threat of force. It would be fatal, however, to act on the assumption that this is an accomplished fact. Indeed the future is going to call on all of us for certain qualities.

We are going to need vigilance and a healthy dose of "I come from Missouri." If the words Mr. Khrushchev signed at Camp David that "all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the application of force but by peaceful means through negotiation" are to have real meaning, then we will watch carefully to see whether other countries in what the Communists

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, June 1, 1959, p. 779.

call their "camp" under the acknowledged leadership of the Soviet Union will now comport themselves in consonance with the agreed words I have quoted. We will watch to see if all the difficulties and dangers created by Communist China through the use of force or the threat of its use along its long borders will diminish and disappear. We will watch to see whether Communist China is now at last willing to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan area.

Vigilance, however, means more than just watching a barometer to see if storms are receding. It requires the continued effort and sacrifice necessary to maintain our own defenses. It requires a continued consideration for all those who are allied with us, including the need of all of them for liberal trading policies on the part of this country and for our continuation of economic and military assistance in cases where certain partners cannot carry alone their full share of the cost of our collective defense. It requires also a continued willingness to do our share in helping the lesser developed regions of this world to develop their resources and capabilities and thereby enabling their governments to hold out to their people the prospect of a better life.

Vigilance, then, means resolution, a determination to keep on doing many things that are expensive and inconvenient.

Patience also is called for in successful negotiation. The 10 weeks which the Secretary of State spent in Geneva last spring and summer negotiating with the Soviet Foreign Minister on the problems of Germany and Berlin produced little progress other than a clarification of the issues. But 10 weeks is well spent if some progress can be recorded. I recall that there were nearly 400 negotiating meetings with the Soviets over the Austrian state treaty. They began in 1947. It was 8 long years later, in May of 1955, that the treaty was signed. Those 8 years were hard on the negotiators. They were far harder on the Austrian people. The point, however, is that negotiation of even the less difficult of the issues which divide us can be slow and time consuming.

There is one thing else which I believe is required of us—a clearer concept and understanding

in our own minds of this great experimental society which we have built in the United States and a clearer articulation to the rest of the world of what it means. We are changing our society, modifying it, improving it every day. We have pragmatically developed a unique economic and social community under our own remarkable Constitution, but we are incredibly tongue-tied when it comes to describing to others or even to ourselves what makes us tick. And what makes us tick is more important than our material achievements, because the latter are only the reflection of the former. Our pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness rests essentially on our belief in the individual dignity and worth of the human being. Only under such a system can man's creative gifts be lastingly and richly evoked.

The peaceful competition which Mr. Khrushchev says is what he wants should be to us more than an invitation to outstrip all competitors in producing more tons of steel or more automobiles or space machines. What we are engaged in is in fact a contest between two philosophies with antithetical concepts of the role of the individual in the society of which he is a part. What we believe in our hearts in the long run is at least as important as what we produce with our hands. On faith and works our whole future depends.

Crown Prince of Ethiopia Tours United States

The Department of State announced on October 6 (press release 701) that His Imperial Highness Crown Prince Asfa Wossen of Ethiopia would arrive at New York on that day for an informal visit to the United States. The Crown Prince, accompanied by Crown Princess Medferiash Worq Abebe and a small party, will tour this country and Canada until early November.

The U.S. itinerary includes New York, Boston, Washington, Detroit, Chicago, Colorado Springs, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Honolulu. On October 19 the Crown Prince plans to visit Ottawa.

Hemispheric Progress Based on Understanding

by R. R. Rubottom, Jr.

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

I am pleased and honored to have been asked to speak to the distinguished individuals gathered here in Denver under the auspices of the United States National Commission for UNESCO. Your presence here gives clear evidence of the importance our people attach to the work of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and to the interplay of national cultures in today's world. The Government and the people of the United States recognize the importance of fomenting educational, scientific, and cultural activities throughout the world, budgeting significant shares of their talent and funds to the improvement of education in many countries, to the promotion and exchange of scientific knowledge, and to the stimulation of cultural exchanges.

Certainly, one of the things which enriches the lives of people in the Western Hemisphere is, and has been for many decades, the exchange of cultures among them. We of the Americas believe in the same ideals, we honor each other's heroes, we read and enjoy the fruits of efforts by poets and artists from each other's countries, we sing and dance to each other's music, and we share intimate and mutually rewarding political and economic relationships. All of us benefit immeasurably from these exchanges, and it is important that they continue and flourish. There has been a greatly increased emphasis on the cultural exchange program during the past 2 years, including that at the level of the university student. During the school year which ended last June,

there were over 10,000 Latin American students in our universities, while 1,188 Americans were studying in Latin American institutions. We believe that salutary results in improved mutual understanding are already noticeable.

It is especially fitting that the theme of this 7th National Conference should be the United States and its relations with the other American Republics. The discussions here will throw additional light on our problems, some of them already exhaustively analyzed. They should also lead us to new levels of understanding of the mutuality of these problems. Through such understanding we hope to find the answers. Tonight I shall report some encouraging progress toward that goal.

Benefits From Inter-American Meetings

Conferences of ministers and meetings of experts do not always provide immediate, visible solutions to the problems which they are convened to take up. However, such meetings in this hemisphere usually are productive of constructive, long-term results, especially in dealing with matters which are susceptible to multilateral consideration. Let us review the inter-American meetings, beginning with that of the Presidents in Panama just 3 years ago. They have been numerous, perhaps due to the critical times we have lived through. The Presidents themselves created the Committee of Presidential Representatives² which convened three times, terminating its labor

¹ Address made at the opening plenary session of the 7th National Conference held under the auspices of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO at Denver, Colo., on Sept. 29 (press release 680).

² For a statement on the Committee's report by President Eisenhower, together with a Committee announcement at the conclusion of its final meeting, see BULLETIN of June 24, 1957, p. 1014.

in May 1957. It recommended, among other things, the creation of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission, which is holding its first meeting in Washington shortly. This will provide a regional forum for cooperation in the vital field of nuclear energy, which offers such thrilling prospects for its peaceful application.

In September 1957 the oft-postponed Economic Conference of Buenos Aires was held.³ While it was not possible to negotiate an overall economic agreement as some countries desired, the 3 weeks' discussion of this subject cleared up much misunderstanding. Moreover, several of its resolutions on specific economic subjects helped to remove obstacles to progress in those sectors as time has revealed.

In September 1958 the foreign ministers gathered in Washington for the first informal meeting ever held, a 2-day discussion of the world situation and of how best to take advantage of Brazilian President Kubitschek's initiative known as "Operation Pan America."⁴ There resulted from that meeting the establishment of the Committee of 21, which held its first meeting in Washington,⁵ followed by the meeting in Buenos Aires last April.⁶ Noteworthy results of the Committee's efforts were the resolution on economic studies of individual countries in the hemisphere, the one on financing of economic development, that on commodity problems, and that dealing with the common market.

In January of this year there began 3 months' negotiations which led to the creation of the Inter-American Bank,⁷ for half a century the dream of Latin America. It is under consideration in virtually every country in the hemisphere at this time, and several ratifications are expected to be deposited shortly.

Then there was the fifth Meeting of Consultation of foreign ministers in Santiago last month.⁸

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1957, p. 539.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 13, 1958, p. 574.

⁵ For remarks made by Under Secretary Dillon, see *ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1958, p. 918.

⁶ For a statement made by Assistant Secretary Thomas C. Mann, who was chief of the U.S. delegation, see *ibid.*, June 22, 1959, p. 931.

⁷ For background, see *ibid.*, p. 928.

⁸ For statements made by Secretary Herter at the meeting, see *ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1959, p. 299; for the Secretary's statement upon his return from the meeting, together with texts of the Declaration of Santiago de Chile and the Resolution on the Inter-American Peace Committee, see *ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

This conference was called on an urgent basis to consider problems relating to intervention and to the defense of human rights and establishment of representative democracy.

The wholesome results of that meeting are already self-evident. For one thing, the reactivation of the Inter-American Peace Committee by assigning it important functions to carry out between now and the Quito conference is a hopeful augury. I shall touch on this meeting in greater detail later.

Shared Aspirations

We who live in the United States share the aspirations of those who live in the other American Republics, especially the popular demand for increased individual rights, for improved welfare, and for higher cultural standards in the nations of this hemisphere. This demand has two principal points of emphasis, the development of national economies to provide higher levels of living for the mass of people and more effective exercise of representative democracy based upon respect for the rights of man. We are committed to these goals and at the Santiago meeting of foreign ministers Secretary Herter made clear our dedication to their accomplishment throughout the Americas.

In our own country there is yet much to be done to assure the continuing development of our economy to provide constantly improving living conditions for our people. We recognize, as I hope our friends do, that the process of development never stops. It is the antithesis of the static, the essence of the dynamic. In fact, the more developed a country becomes the greater the potential and the demand for further development. On the other hand, the United States as a nation and its individual citizens have long understood the importance of assisting less developed countries and newly emerging states which have just gained political independence. We have offered our cooperation to help them to achieve for themselves economic and social betterment. While in our own interest to do so, it would be unfair to millions of Americans to think that this was their sole motivation.

Of the many ingredients necessary to this process of growth the foremost are, of course, a country's own human resources. It is essentially the manner in which the human element develops the

natural resources available to it and distributes among its members the fruits of its labors that determines the level of prosperity which a people will enjoy. All that the United States—or any other outside element—can contribute to the improvement of another country's economy is some small but perhaps essential part of the missing ingredients.

By the same token, political development never stops. While we in the United States may be entitled to take considerable satisfaction in the stature of the individual in our still emerging democracy, we must exercise constant vigilance to avoid complacency. In the political sector of our lives, as in the economic, our greatest challenge may be that of protecting deeply held principles while accommodating ourselves to the inevitable changes that a dynamic society generates within itself.

Thus we are not, and could never be, less than staunch supporters of our friends and neighbors in their determined efforts toward the goals which we share with them—truly representative democracies and economies responsive to the aspirations of all of the peoples of this hemisphere.

The meeting of foreign ministers of the 21 American Republics which took place in Santiago, Chile, last month provided an opportunity to re-examine these goals and chart new courses for their accomplishment. Full and fruitful advantage was taken of this opportunity, proving again the statesmanship of those who so wisely and foresightedly created in the inter-American system an instrument responsive to the evolving needs of our community. I would like to quote the evaluation placed on this system by Secretary Herter in addressing the meeting of foreign ministers:*

The inter-American system and the Organization of American States constitute one of the bulwarks of freedom in a world that continues to be threatened by the aggressive and imperialistic designs of international communism. The maintenance of a strong inter-American system is therefore an integral part of the supreme effort in which all of us participate to preserve our liberties and the finer aspects of civilization itself.

At Santiago understandings were reached on grave problems which involved two of the basic

concepts of this inter-American system—the principle of nonintervention by any American state in the affairs of any other American state, and the rights of our peoples to the effective exercise of representative democracy.

I am convinced, and I am certain that this conviction is generally shared, that both of these concepts were not only reaffirmed at Santiago—their implementation was effectively advanced by understandings reached and concrete measures adopted there. The whole fabric of democratic ideals which unite our peoples was thereby strengthened.

Communist Threat to Inter-American System

It is not illogical, quite the contrary, that this inter-American system should be a prime target of international communism. One must expect that a free, voluntary association of 21 nations who so successfully treat with each other as equals and who share concepts of morality and sovereignty so alien to dialectic materialism reap the scorn and enmity of Soviet imperialism and its agents. Nor is this feeling confined to words; it is well known that plans to sabotage the 11th Inter-American Conference in Quito next year were openly discussed when Latin American Communists attended the Soviet Communist Party meeting in Moscow last January.

The strength, both spiritual and material, which is afforded each of our 21 American Republics through this collective endeavor to further the rights and aspirations of our individual citizens is a defense against the Communist efforts to impose in this hemisphere, by subversion or force, a Marxist totalitarianism such as exists in Hungary, Tibet, and other lands.

Communism of the variety now seen at mid-20th century poses a special problem for all of the American Republics, including our own country. It has attempted to steal much of the truly democratic terminology and convert this language to its own use. "Peace," "democracy," "freedom," "progress," "liberty," "justice"—all of these words connote to us of the Americas principles for which our forebears fought in their wars of independence and which we have since defended with our lives. Communism has corrupted and distorted them in its efforts to provide a cloak of respect-

* *Ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1959, p. 301.

bility for its naked aggressions and efforts to subvert free countries. It is duplicity of this type, plus the utter lack of any spiritual motivation in the Communist philosophy and its failure to recognize the spiritual spark burning in the soul of every human being, that makes the Communist conspiracy so revolting as it attempts to destroy the things which we hold most sacred in the Americas.

Action To Support Positive Values

We must oppose communism because it attempts to destroy these very basic concepts on which our American Republics have been founded. But this is not to say that we subscribe just to a sterile, negative line. We stand for the positive values of freedom with justice, of representative democracy, and of opportunity, both national and individual, for economic improvement. To these aspirations we are firmly pledged.

Any serious discussion of political aspects of our inter-American system which did not seek to relate them to economic progress would fail to face present-day realities, as the two are intimately bound together. However, much as it may subscribe to the principles of democracy, a government which does not create for its people the conditions which will provide them with the opportunity to acquire, through their own efforts, a more abundant and rewarding life for themselves and their children cannot long endure.

Through radio, television, motion pictures, and other media, people throughout the world have become increasingly aware of the material as well as the spiritual benefits which can be achieved under the political-economic system enjoyed by the peoples of North America and to an increasing degree in Western Europe. Where people are free to do so, they are seeking to adapt this system to their own environment and way of life. To the extent that it is considered mutually advantageous, the people and Government of our country are participating in this development in other lands.

Our contribution, private as well as public, to the economic development of Latin America has been broad and massive, as I will presently show. The same may be said of our trade with that area, which in the last 10 years reached the enormous aggregate of over \$35 billion each way.

The mutual benefit of this relationship is not lost on the Communists, who are making increasingly determined efforts to disrupt it. Obviously, this essential contribution to the developing economies of the hemisphere frustrates their designs against the free world. In that connection one may well speculate as to the extent to which the talk by recent Soviet visitors to this country of a greatly increased Soviet-United States trade is motivated by a desire to replace traditional suppliers of items which we now purchase in Latin America and other parts of the free world. Certainly, there is very little else that the Soviet Union could supply to the United States market.

Financing of Economic Development

The extent to which United States Government funds have been employed in the last decade to assist the economies of the Latin American countries is sometimes not appreciated. The most important instrument of our public cooperation with Latin America is the Export-Import Bank. In the 10-year period ending June 30, 1959, loan authorizations by the Bank to countries in Latin America amounted to \$2,667,000,000. Since 1950 the United States has spent \$225 million on its bilateral technical cooperation programs in Latin America (an amount, incidentally, which has been more than matched by the respective host countries). Beginning in 1954, we have made available funds to certain Latin American countries under the heading of "Special Assistance"; through fiscal 1959, such assistance has amounted to over \$205 million.

As you know, the Development Loan Fund began its operations only very recently. Nevertheless, it has already approved loans to Latin America amounting to nearly \$69 million and has several other projects under urgent consideration. Finally, local currencies loaned back for economic development purposes to Latin American countries purchasing surplus commodities under Public Law 480 have aggregated \$297 million.

If you will add up the various items I have just mentioned, representing the flow of United States public funds to Latin America in the last 10 years or less, you will come to a grand total of nearly \$3.5 billion.

However, this is not the whole story as regards public funds. The World Bank, the International

Monetary Fund, and the International Finance Corporation have all been very active in Latin America. These are international institutions, and loans or advances made by them can by no means be regarded as deriving exclusively from the United States. Nevertheless, the United States has provided a large share of the capital of each of these institutions, and the great bulk of the money they have used in their operations has been raised from public or private sources in this country. Up to June 30 of this year, credits authorized to Latin America by the World Bank have amounted to \$981 million and those of the International Finance Corporation to \$16 million. Gross drawings by Latin American countries from the Monetary Fund up to the same date have aggregated \$664 million. The United States has been gratified to join with its comembers in making these sizable contributions to Latin American development and stabilization.

Our Government is continuing, and will continue, to provide the types of financial and economic assistance to each of the other 20 American Republics which they and we find mutually desirable.

Together with the Latin American Republics, and within the framework of the Organization of American States, our Government has in recent months been participating in projects to further strengthen this inter-American economic cooperation. The progress which has been made in the formulation and execution of Operation Pan America and the formation of the Inter-American Development Bank are positive achievements in the creation of the economic and social climate in which democracy can flourish.

Our Government has pressed forward in formalizing its participation in the Inter-American Development Bank. The session of Congress which just adjourned passed the necessary legislation to authorize our participation and the payment of our share of the capital.

Last year the capital of the Export-Import Bank, which traditionally has given a major share of its attention to the development needs of Latin America, was increased by \$2 billion. Likewise, we have taken an active role in making more effective the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank.¹⁰ With the increased re-

sources advocated, these institutions will be able to provide substantially greater services to Latin America.

I have spoken up to now of some of the ways in which the United States Government, as such, has engaged in measures of economic cooperation with our Latin American neighbors. But such public efforts by no means represent the full extent of this country's contribution to the economic development of Latin America.

On the contrary, the flow of private capital from the United States to Latin America has exceeded the flow of public funds. In the decade from the end of 1948 to the end of 1958, private American direct investments in Latin America have increased, partly through new capital transfers and partly through the reinvestment of earnings, by nearly \$4.6 billion. Thus, in a period corresponding roughly to the past 10 years, our total participation, both public and private, to the economic development of Latin America has been over \$8 billion. I want to stress that this amount is apart from the funds made available by international lending institutions in which the United States plays a major role.

That the amount of private American capital going to Latin America should be larger than the flow of United States public funds to that area is natural and as it should be. There are definite limitations on the amount of public capital available for lending to other countries, limitations which stem from the fact that such funds, in the last analysis, are provided by the United States taxpayer. No such limitations apply to private capital. I think I can confidently say that, welcomed and given a suitable climate, American investors would be prepared to supply very large additional amounts of capital to Latin America, probably as much as that area could economically absorb for a long time to come.

In recent years there has been an increasing recognition of the contribution which private capital can make to the economic progress of underdeveloped countries. Most Latin American countries indeed have made strong efforts through such devices as tax incentives, duty exemptions, the enactment of appropriate legal codes, to create the conditions which attract foreign capital.

This contribution cannot be measured by the value of the textile machinery or rolling mills or tractors or roadbuilding equipment which are im-

¹⁰ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 5, 1959, p. 488, and Oct. 19, 1959, p. 53.

ported with the invested capital, important as these things may be. The true value of foreign investment can be measured only in the increased flow of goods and services which it helps to bring about and which, in its absence, would not occur. I mean such things as the production of a greater volume and better variety of consumer goods, expanded exports, greater job opportunities, and increased sources of tax revenues. All these things add up in the end to a higher standard of living.

But the process of foreign investment also has an extremely important byproduct, namely, technical and business training. The vast majority of the technical and managerial personnel of American subsidiaries and branch plants in Latin America are Latin Americans. Every industrial plant, mine, and merchandising establishment in Latin America financed by private United States capital can thus be said to be a cooperative training school in modern business methods and efficiency. In the long run this private technical cooperation may well be as important as the physical investment itself.

We have all heard of the term "venture capital." This is an apt phrase. Individuals and firms investing their funds in foreign countries, and especially in underdeveloped countries, are in many ways breaking new ground. They must be imaginative in recognizing opportunities for finding or developing new resources, or for increasing production from old. They must frequently be willing to take large risks.

In return they ask only that they be permitted to earn a reasonable rate of return on their investments on the basis of fair and juridically approved international practice, and freedom from arbitrary harassments. In the absence of such conditions there is no inducement for Americans to venture their capital in foreign countries, particularly when there are so many opportunities for remunerative investment right here at home.

Progress Through Commodity Consultations

In the commodity field, although no problems have been "solved" to the satisfaction of all parties, we have made significant progress in reconciling viewpoints and reducing differences to least common denominators through resort to an old and tried technique—the open forum. Divergen-

cies of viewpoint can often be narrowed appreciably through frank discussion around a conference table, and we are encouraging a wider discussion of commodity problems both within the hemisphere and in international forums when problems are of broader scope.

Coffee affords a good example of our new approach. Since the United States produces no coffee, except for Hawaii, we had, until 2 years ago, tended to leave the initiative in developing solutions of the surplus problem to the producing countries. However, by 1957 it became increasingly clear that a decline in coffee prices to levels which then threatened could seriously affect the economic stability of some of the producing countries of this hemisphere. In an effort to help these countries to help themselves, we gave our support to calling a meeting of all coffee-producing and coffee-consuming countries to examine the surplus problem and see what steps might be taken to prevent a further accumulation of stocks and to assure orderly marketing. This coffee study group met first in May 1958, and by October of that year the 15 coffee-producing countries of this hemisphere had developed a plan for emergency action to which all could subscribe and which has proved very successful in moderating price declines over the past year.

A long-range solution of the coffee problem will require the collaboration of producing areas outside the hemisphere; so it was encouraging to note that, when the study group met in Washington earlier this month to develop plans for next year, European and African countries were also in attendance. Their readiness to negotiate on short-term marketing arrangements and to cooperate in long-range planning has resulted in a coffee agreement which augurs well for the future.

Lead and zinc have been one of the thorniest problems in our relations with Latin America in recent years. World prices fell sharply in the 1957 recession, and the United States established quotas on imports for which we were roundly criticized. A special conference was called by the U.N., where we explained our problems and other countries explained theirs. Although we are one of the principal markets for metals produced in Latin America, we are only one factor in a large world market, and at the conclusion of that meet-

ing there was general recognition that a sound solution must be sought on an international scale.

The lead study group has now been established by the United Nations on a continuing basis. The United States is a member, and we are hopeful that in the future problems can be foreseen and appropriate measures taken.

Consultation has also been used effectively in relation to the cotton problem. Cotton is an important export crop in many countries, and whenever surpluses appear and prices decline cotton export policy becomes a problem in hemisphere relations. Cotton prices had been falling this spring when Mexico took the lead in setting up a small committee, on which the principal exporting countries are represented, to see what could be done within the terms of existing legislation to avoid competitive undercutting of prices, to increase exports, and to stimulate consumption of cotton fiber. That committee has met regularly this summer and made a constructive contribution to hemisphere relations in its limited field by informing each country regarding the cotton problems of the others and by singling out those aspects of the cotton problem where international collaboration is practicable.

For the relatively underdeveloped countries of the world the stability and expansion of markets for their raw materials is a matter of primary importance. Largely at their instance, a special Commission on International Commodity Trade was established by the Economic and Social Council several years ago to work on trade problems in these basic commodities. This year the United States became a member of that Commission, and we expect to participate actively in its work as further evidence of our belief that full discussion is the road to broader understanding. The problem of expanding world trade is also being studied by a committee established by the Contracting Parties to the GATT, to which the United States

and eight of the Latin American countries belong. This committee is making a study of obstacles to the expansion of trade in raw materials and expects to develop recommendations for constructive action.

The United States has been a party for many years to the International Sugar Agreement, one of the very few intergovernmental agreements designed to stabilize prices of a basic raw material in world markets. That agreement was renegotiated this year and has again been ratified by the United States. While we do not export sugar, it is an important export crop for Latin America; so the new agreement is further evidence of growing hemisphere understanding in the trade sphere.

In the problems related to basic commodities such as sugar, lead and zinc, coffee, and cotton, which are of such importance to the economies of our 21 countries, the American Republics have found that through consultation progress can be made toward mutually acceptable understandings. Similarly, in seeking solutions to the challenge posed by the needs of a rapidly increasing population for a more ample supply of goods and services, our Governments and our peoples are working together.

We are indeed fortunate in this hemisphere to have in the inter-American system not only an institution, the Organization of American States, through which our common problems may be studied and dealt with constructively. More important, however, are the spiritual and cultural values which the peoples of this hemisphere share and the sense of a common New World destiny. It is these elements, intangible as they are, which make the inter-American system the uniquely powerful force for good which it is today. With the renewed confidence which comes from success, we can anticipate that in the years to come the nations of this American community will reach even higher levels of understanding.

Immigration Legislation, 1959

by Frank L. Auerbach

Two immigration measures were passed by the first session of the 86th Congress: Public Law 86-253, which extends temporarily the provisions of earlier legislation permitting the admission of certain adopted orphans and of close relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens afflicted with tuberculosis, and Public Law 86-363, an act facilitating the admission of certain relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens. Both laws follow the pattern set by previous immigration legislation passed since the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 in that certain provisions amend existing law while others are set up as independent statutory provisions, although they affect the operations of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Both acts originated in the House of Representatives, where they were introduced by Representative Francis E. Walter, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration and coauthor of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Reuniting Families

Of the two acts, Public Law 86-363, approved by the President on September 22, 1959, has the broader application. Its major provisions, recasting the quota preference categories of the Immigration and Nationality Act, were prompted by the finding of the House Judiciary Committee¹ that

... the recognized principle of avoiding separation of families could be furthered if certain categories of such relatives were reclassified in the various preference portions of the immigration quotas.

Under the law in effect prior to the enactment

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of Public Law 86-363, skilled aliens needed in the United States were accorded first preference, with a first call on 50 percent of each quota; parents of U.S. citizens second preference, with a first call on 30 percent of each quota; and spouses and children of permanent resident aliens third preference, with a first call on 20 percent of each quota. Any portion of the quota not used by a given preference category was made available to any of the other preference groups. Quota numbers not used by any of the preference groups were available to all other applicants for immigrant visas—the so-called nonpreference group—with a priority of 25 percent for brothers, sisters, sons, and daughters of U.S. citizens.²

Public Law 86-363 significantly changes the order of preferences and priorities for quota immigrants who claim such preference or priority based on relationship to U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens. Without disturbing the first preference category of skilled aliens with a first call on 50 percent of each quota, the new law moves unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens from the fourth to the second preference category, broadens the third preference category by including unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens, and modifies the previous fourth preference category by according it 50 percent of the portion of each quota not used by the first three preference categories and by including in it spouses and children of brothers, sisters, and married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens. The

¹ H. Rept. 582, 86th Cong., 1st sess., June 26, 1959, p. 2.

² Under previous and present law the "child" of a U.S. citizen, i.e. a person unmarried and under 21 years of age, is entitled to nonquota status and the "child" of a permanent resident alien to third-preference quota status. For a full definition of the term "child," see sec. 101(b) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended.

following comparative table shows the changes brought about by the new legislation.

	Quota preferences under previous law	Quota preferences under P.L. 86-363
First preference	50 percent of each quota to skilled aliens and spouses and children if accompanying or following to join them.	Same
Second preference	30 percent of each quota to parents of U.S. citizens.	30 percent of each quota to parents and unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens.
Third preference	20 percent of each quota to spouses and children of permanent resident aliens.	20 percent of each quota to spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens.
Fourth preference	25 percent of portion of each quota not used by first three preference groups, to brothers, sisters, sons, and daughters of U.S. citizens.	50 percent of the portion of each quota not used by the first three preference groups, to brothers, sisters, and married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens and their spouses and children if accompanying them.

The provisions of the new act which recast the quota preferences and priorities do not increase the sum total of quota numbers available to relatives under each quota. The anticipated effect of the transfer of unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens from the fourth preference category into the second preference category, where they compete for quota numbers with parents of U.S. citizens, is stated in a letter dated August 10, 1959, from the Department of State to Senator James O. Eastland, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.³ The pertinent portions of this letter read as follows:

As a consequence of this transfer, the second preference portion of several quotas and subquotas, presently current, may become oversubscribed. There is set out below a list

³ For text, see S. Rept. 962, 86th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 8, 1959, p. 5.

of countries and colonies whose quotas and subquotas, respectively, may be so affected by the enactment of section 1 of the bill. The column in the middle shows the fourth preference registrations as reported to the Department, on May 1, 1959. These figures include married sons and daughters, as well as brothers and sisters, of U.S. citizens.

Quota or subquota area	4th preference registrations	Annual quota or subquota
Australia.....	75	100
China.....	141	100
Hungary.....	754	865
India.....	82	100
Iran.....	114	100
Iraq.....	117	100
British subquotas:		
Bahamas.....	76	100
Barbados.....	387	100
British Guiana.....	81	100
Cyprus.....	185	100
Malta.....	262	100
Israel.....	104	100
Italy.....	63,669	5,666
Latvia.....	101	235
Lebanon.....	278	100
Lithuania.....	198	384
Morocco.....	111	100
Palestine.....	247	100
Poland.....	3,220	6,488
Portugal.....	2,466	438
Tunisia.....	71	100
Yugoslavia.....	1,706	942

There follows a listing of quotas and subquotas wherein the second preference portion is already oversubscribed.

Quota or subquota area	2d preference registrations	Annual quota or subquota
Chinese persons.....	450	105
Jamaican subquota.....	624	100
Trinidad subquota.....	169	100
Greece.....	4,568	308
Japan.....	371	185
Philippines.....	723	100
Rumania.....	517	289
Spain.....	627	250
Turkey.....	510	225
United Arab Republic.....	397	100

It appears, therefore, that the inclusion of the unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens in the second preference category will inevitably prolong the waiting time of many parents of U.S. citizens and will cause the second preference portion of many quotas and subquotas to become oversubscribed and others to become more heavily oversubscribed.

It may also be pointed out that under some quotas which are now experiencing a low second preference demand, such as the quotas of Australia, India, Israel, Korea, and New Zealand, first preference applicants chargeable to these quotas are benefiting presently from this situation in that quota numbers which would ordinarily be assigned

to qualified second preference applicants are being made available, as the law prescribes, for the issuance of visas to first preference applicants. Hence the enactment of section 1 of the bill would also adversely affect such first preference visa applicants.

Nonquota Status for Certain Relatives of U.S. Citizens and Permanent Resident Aliens

Following the pattern set by previous legislation, Congress provided relief for the increasing numbers of relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent residents who, though entitled to preference quota status, have to anticipate an extended waiting period under certain quotas. The new legislation accords nonquota status to all applicants for immigrant visas who, under previous law, were entitled to second, third, or fourth preference quota status if they were registered on a consular waiting list under a priority date earlier than December 31, 1953, and if a petition according them quota preference status had been approved by the Attorney General before January 1, 1959. Non-quota status is also accorded to the spouses and children of such aliens irrespective of whether they meet the deadline requirements applicable to their principals.

Some 22,000 visa petitions approved before January 1, 1959, are in the hands of consular officers on behalf of applicants who were registered on consular waiting lists prior to December 31, 1953. Since these petitions do not indicate whether their beneficiaries are married and have children, the total number of aliens who may benefit from this liberalization of quota restrictions is difficult to predict. If experience gained in the past serves as a guide, it is believed that some 55,000 aliens may benefit from this provision of the law if they can meet the qualitative standards of the immigration laws. Immigrants chargeable to the following quota and subquota areas⁴ will, in the order of the listing, primarily benefit from this measure: Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Jamaica, Spain, Palestine, Philippines, Lebanon, United Arab Republic, Japan, Chinese Persons, and Turkey. Of the 22,000 visa petitions on hand, some

⁴ A complete listing of immigration quotas and quota areas is shown on the "Immigration Quota Areas" map dated July 1, 1959, copies of which are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (20 cents).

12,000 are approved for aliens chargeable to the Italian quota so that it is likely that a total of some 30,000 aliens chargeable to the Italian quota will qualify for nonquota status.

Uniting Refugee Families

There were 188,752 immigrants who came to the United States under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, as amended, which expired on December 31, 1956.⁵ While most of these immigrants came with their families, there are a number of instances in which members of the immediate families of refugees were left behind for reasons of health, for economic reasons, or because of the separation of the family existing at the time of the migration of the principal. In most of these cases the preceding head of the family has filed a petition for the remaining members of his family according them preference quota status. However, as a result of the oversubscription of certain quotas, some of these families are still separated.

To remedy this situation Congress accorded nonquota status to the husband, wife, and child of any permanent resident alien who was admitted into the United States under the provisions of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, as amended, if a petition for third preference quota status was approved by the Attorney General before January 1, 1959. Also, parents of U.S. citizens who came to the United States under the Refugee Relief Act are accorded nonquota status under the same condition.

To benefit from these provisions the alien must have retained his relationship to the petitioner and the status as established in the approved petition.⁶ Since the law in most cases requires a lapse of 5 years after admission to the United States before an immigrant may apply for naturalization, the number of persons who came to the United States under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 and who have since become naturalized and have petitioned for the admission of their parents is expected to be relatively small, so that not many alien parents will be able to qualify for nonquota

⁵ *Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service* (Washington, D.C., 1958), p. 27.

⁶ If the petitioner has died since approval of the petition, the status would not be considered as having been retained.

status under this provision of the new act. No adequate data are available which would indicate how many persons will benefit from this provision of the new legislation.

Technical Amendments

In the absence of a statutory definition, the terms "son" and "daughter," as used in the immigration provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, have been interpreted to include adopted sons and daughters. This interpretation was based on a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals of August 25, 1953.⁷ In an amendment to existing law which was offered by Representative Walter on the floor of the House,⁸ Public Law 86-363 provides that an adopted son or daughter may become the beneficiary of a petition for nonquota status or a preference quota status only if the adoption took place while the adopted person was under the age of 14 and if the adopted person has been in the legal custody of, and resided with, the adoptive parent or parents for at least 2 years. However, this legislation does not affect adversely petitions already approved before the effective date of this act, September 22, 1959.

Another technical amendment to existing law limits to two the number of children adopted by one family who may derive preferred treatment under the immigration laws, unless this limitation would result in the separation of brothers and sisters. This provision of the bill was prompted by the House Committee's observation:⁹

... certain families have adopted abroad a rather large number of children and the committee has been made aware of certain problems arising from that situation, as well as attempts to evade quota restrictions.

Immigration of Certain Relatives Afflicted With Tuberculosis

Public Law 86-253 of September 9, 1959, extends until June 30, 1961, the provisions of Public Law 85-316 of September 11, 1957, which vested the Attorney General with discretionary authority to grant waivers of inadmissibility in the case of certain aliens afflicted with tuberculosis. The

original provision enacted in 1957 authorized the Attorney General to admit spouses and children of U.S. citizens and of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and parents who have a son or daughter who is a U.S. citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, irrespective of their being afflicted with tuberculosis, if they complied with terms, conditions, and controls prescribed by the Attorney General after consultation with the Surgeon General of the United States. The purpose of the 1957 provision was to reunite families separated as a result of the health condition of one of its members. In extending this provision until June 30, 1961, Congress broadened its scope by authorizing the Attorney General to grant the waiver to the afflicted spouse, child, or parent of an alien who has been issued an immigrant visa. In explaining this amendment the House Judiciary Committee observed:¹⁰

In order to avoid the separation of families who, of course, desire to migrate together, and in order to facilitate the task of the intergovernmental and national agencies assisting the beneficiaries of this legislation, it is felt that it is desirable to make it possible to grant a waiver to the afflicted person after the members of his immediate family were issued immigrant visas. Thus, the family units would be united during the journey and would be in a position to make their lawful entry into the United States together.

Another amendment eliminates the requirement of previous law that the Attorney General report promptly to Congress in any case in which he granted a waiver under it.

Congress chose a 2-year extension of the tuberculosis provision rather than pass permanent legislation "for the purpose of obtaining more experience and provide for a longer trial period in this sensitive segment of our immigration policy."¹¹

Immigration of Eligible Orphans

The temporary program for the admission as nonquota immigrants of eligible orphans adopted or to be adopted by a U.S. citizen and spouse contained in Public Law 85-316 of September 11, 1957, expired by its own terms on June 30, 1959. Charges and countercharges were made in public

⁷ *In the Matter of R—*, 5, I. & N. Dec. 438.

⁸ *Congressional Record* of July 6, 1959, pp. 11578-11580.

⁹ H. Rept. 582, 86th Cong., 1st sess., June 26, 1959, p. 4.

¹⁰ H. Rept. 291, 86th Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 23, 1959, p. 15.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

about the alleged abuse of this provision of the law, particularly in the case of orphans adopted by proxy. Rather than extend the provision of the 1957 act in its original form as proposed by the Senate,¹² the House insisted on amending the law by requiring that no visa may be issued to an eligible orphan, either adopted or to be adopted, unless an appropriate petition, filed by the adoptive parents or the prospective adoptive parents, has been approved by the Attorney General. Another amendment requires that the Attorney General make a finding that the adoptive or prospective adoptive parents are persons of good moral character. In proposing these amendments Representative Walter made the following statement:¹³

It has been pointed out on the floor of the Senate yesterday that many instances of abuse under the provisions of the 1957 law have been reported and fairly well documented. More than that, a special committee of the Legislature of the State of New York has confirmed many of the worst suspicions. There are some indictments pending affecting individuals who have made a lucrative business out of acting as intermediaries between the alien orphans and American couples desiring to adopt them. Irrespective of the legal and moral questions involved, the continuation of those practices may create for the children themselves more hardship in this country than they may possibly endure if they would remain abroad. Remedy must be tried, and we believe that one is readily available.

The Walter-McCarran Act contains in section 205 a very carefully specified petition procedure under which a U.S. citizen desirous to obtain nonquota immigrant status for his own, natural-born alien child, must apply to the Attorney General for a finding of his eligibility. If such petition is approved, the appropriate consular officer is authorized by the Secretary of State to execute his statutory function of determining the eligibility of the beneficiary of the petition. The amendment now before the House proposes that identical procedure be applicable in the cases of alien orphans coming to the United States under the law which is now proposed to be revived for 1 year.

There is only one additional requirement added to the petition procedure now applicable to natural-born children of U.S. citizens, and that is that there be a finding of good moral character made in the case of the adoptive parents. This is, indeed, a minimum requirement if it is borne in mind that the paramount question before us is to ascertain whether the alien orphan child will find in

the United States a proper home. The authority vested in the Attorney General is sufficiently broad to permit him to eradicate the malpractices which disturb us all.

The language of the amended law makes it clear that the petition procedure prescribed by the amendment does not affect the consular officer's primary responsibility for the determination that the orphan is an "eligible orphan" as defined by law.

Both Houses agreed that the orphan provision should be extended for not more than 1 year "in order to give the Committees on the Judiciary of both Houses an opportunity to further investigate and study the administration and the broader aspects of the orphans' admission program."¹⁴

Implementation of New Acts by Department of State and Immigration and Naturalization Service

As soon as the two amendatory measures were passed by both Houses of Congress, the Department of State informed its consular officers overseas. They were also notified when the President approved the bills on September 9 and September 22, 1959, respectively. Pending the issuance of visa regulations, they were instructed concerning their part in the implementation of the new measures.

As a result of the new immigrant categories created by Public Law 86-363, it became necessary to prescribe the following new immigrant visa symbols:

New Preference Categories

Class	Section of act	Symbol
Unmarried son or daughter of U.S. citizen (second preference). ¹	203(a)(2)	U-2
Unmarried son or daughter of alien resident (third preference).	203(a)(3)	V-2
Married son or daughter of U.S. citizen (fourth preference).	203(a)(4)	W-2
Spouse of brother, sister, son, or daughter of U.S. citizen (fourth preference).	203(a)(4)	W-3
Child of brother, sister, son, or daughter of U.S. citizen (fourth preference).	203(a)(4)	W-4
Adopted son or daughter of U.S. citizen who is beneficiary of petition approved prior to enactment of P.L. 86-363 (fourth preference).	Sec. 5(c), P.L. 86-363	W-5

¹ Second preference quota visas issued to parents of U.S. citizens will bear the symbol U-1.

¹² *Congressional Record* of July 15, 1959, p. 12254.

¹³ *Ibid.*, July 16, 1959, p. 12386.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

New Nonquota Categories

Class	Section of act	Symbol
Parent of U.S. citizen registered prior to December 31, 1953.	Sec. 4, P.L. 86-363.	K-15
Spouse or child of alien resident registered prior to December 31, 1953.	Sec. 4, P.L. 86-363.	K-16
Brother, sister, son, or daughter of U.S. citizen registered prior to December 31, 1953.	Sec. 4, P.L. 86-363.	K-17
Spouse or child of alien classified K-15, K-16, or K-17.	Sec. 4, P.L. 86-363.	K-18
Parent of U.S. citizen admitted as alien under Refugee Relief Act of 1953.	Sec. 6, P.L. 86-363.	K-19
Spouse or child of alien admitted under Refugee Relief Act of 1953.	Sec. 6, P.L. 86-363.	K-20

These symbols are inserted on immigrant visas and are frequently used in referring to a particular immigrant class. The consular officers were also informed of the ruling by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that petitions approved on behalf of a relative under the old law would automatically be valid for the new preference classification of the alien under the new law. For example, a fourth preference petition approved prior to September 22, 1959, on behalf of an unmarried son of a U.S. citizen may be considered valid for second preference quota status under the new act. This ruling, however, does not apply to the case of an adopted son or daughter for whom a fourth preference quota petition was approved prior to September 22, 1959, the effective date of Public Law 86-363. If such an alien should become eligible for a higher preference status, a new petition will be required in the light of the specific language of the new statute.¹⁵

In implementing the orphan provision of Public Law 86-253 the Immigration and Naturalization Service published regulations on September 12, 1959, designating Form I-600, revised on September 1, 1959, as the petition form to be used by the petitioning adoptive parents.¹⁶ The fee for filing the petition is \$10.

Recent Immigration Legislation and the President's Program

U.S. immigration legislation has always stressed the principle of unification of families. This concept has governed the establishment of quota preferences under the Immigration Acts of May 19,

1921, and May 26, 1924. Increasing emphasis has been given to this principle by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act and in subsequent immigration legislation.

Another principle was developed in the Immigration and Nationality Act, namely, that of according quota preference to skilled aliens needed in the United States. Public Law 85-316 of September 11, 1957, evolved the method of according nonquota status to prospective immigrants who, based on their skill or their close relationship to American citizens or permanent resident aliens, had qualified for quota preference status before a certain cutoff date. Specifically, it accorded nonquota status to all aliens entitled to first, second, or third preference status on whose behalf the Attorney General had approved visa petitions before July 1957. The Congress took this step in view of the existing oversubscription of the preference portions of several immigration quotas. In explaining this action the House Judiciary Committee observed:¹⁷

It has been the policy of the Congress to approve legislation designed to facilitate the reunification of families and it is believed that the enactment of this section of the instant bill will be fully in line with that policy.

The act of August 21, 1958, continued the approach initiated by the act of September 11, 1957, when it accorded nonquota status to aliens eligible for first preference quota visas on whose behalf a petition had been approved by the Attorney General prior to July 1, 1958, thus extending by 1 year the cutoff date provided in the 1957 act. Commenting on this change the House Judiciary Committee noted:¹⁸

The amendment represents a further demonstration of the committee's recognition of the fact that the entry of aliens, whose services are urgently needed in the United States by reason of their high education, experience, exceptional ability, their special skills, etc., and their spouses and children, is in the best interests of the United States.

As described above, Public Law 86-363 converts additional categories of preference quota immigrants to nonquota status based on their meeting

¹⁷ H. Rept. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st sess., Aug. 19, 1957, p. 12.

¹⁸ H. Rept. 2258, 85th Cong., 2d sess., July 23, 1958, p. 3.

¹⁵ P.L. 86-363, 86th Cong., 1st sess., sec. 5(c).

¹⁶ 24 Fed. Reg. 7364.

certain deadlines in relation to their registration on quota waiting lists and the approval of visa petitions in their behalf.

In evaluating the policy of Congress to give special recognition to the need for certain skilled aliens in the United States and to the principle of family unification, it is interesting to note that the same considerations motivated the President when, in his messages of February 8, 1956, and January 31, 1957, to Congress, he proposed that quota numbers not used in one year be reallocated on a regional basis during each following fiscal year for the use of aliens entitled to preference quota status as skilled aliens or as close relatives of U.S. citizens or permanent residence aliens. In his message of January 31, 1957, the President stated:¹⁹

... quota numbers unused in one year should be available for use in the following year. Under existing law if a quota number is not used during the year it becomes void. In my view Congress should pool the unused quota numbers for Europe, Africa, Asia and the Pacific Oceanic area. Those numbers should be distributed during a twelve-month period on a first-come, first-serve basis without regard to country of birth within the area. However, I recommend that these unused quota numbers be available only to aliens who qualify for preference status under existing law—persons having needed skills or close relatives in the United States.

While the objectives of legislation enacted by Congress in recent years and the proposals made by the President in his messages to Congress are identical, the approach used by Congress presents certain administrative problems which the President's formula would not create. The Department of State commented on the pertinent provisions of Public Law 86-363 in a letter dated August 10, 1959, to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee as follows:²⁰

While the Department, as previously stated, endorses the objectives of this bill, it would like to point out that the adoption of Congress of the formula for a redistribution of unused quota numbers, as contained in section 1 of S. 2178, would take care of the problem this bill is designed to alleviate and would do so on a continu-

ing basis within the numerical limits of the quotas established for all quota areas. The provisions of section 1 of S. 2178 are based on the recommendations of the President as set forth in his messages of February 8, 1956, and January 31, 1957, to the Congress. It is believed that if the President's formula for redistributing unused quota numbers had been adopted when it was first proposed the backlog demands on the preference categories would have been eliminated within 2 years after its enactment. In addition to meeting a recurring problem on a permanent basis, it would obviate the necessity for such legislation as sections 9 and 12 of the act of September 11, 1957, and section 2 of the act of August 21, 1958. The President's proposals would also tend to stabilize the workload in the Department as well as in the field thereby avoiding the need for the employment of temporary staffs with all its resultant budgetary and personnel problems.

If past history of U.S. immigration law is any yardstick to future legislation, the following observation may be significant. The Immigration Act of 1924, as originally passed, accorded non-quota status to the alien wife of a U.S. citizen but only preference quota status to the alien husband of a U.S. citizen wife. In 1928 Congress amended this provision by according nonquota status to alien husbands of American women if the marriage occurred before June 1, 1928. Alien husbands by subsequent marriage were still limited to preference quota status. In 1932 Congress moved the cutoff date from June 1, 1928, to July 1, 1932, and in 1948 to January 1, 1948. With the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952 alien spouses of U.S. citizens were placed on an equal footing, irrespective of sex. Thus Congress, after observing the effect of the remedial legislation limited by deadline, eventually took care of the existing problem on a permanent basis.

Should the committees of Congress reach the conclusion that aliens entitled to preference quota status because of their skill or close relationship to U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens should be given continued consideration on a permanent basis, it would appear that the adoption of the President's formula for the annual redistribution of unused quota numbers would achieve this purpose and would enable the administrative agencies entrusted with the enforcement of the law to plan for their budgetary and staff needs more adequately than they can if confronted with periodic enactments which only temporarily achieve the desired objective.

¹⁹ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1957, p. 247. For text of message of Feb. 8, 1956, see *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 275.

²⁰ S. Rept. 962, 86th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 8, 1959, p. 6. The Department offered the same comments in a letter to Chairman Emanuel Celler of the House Judiciary Committee dated June 24, 1959.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

United States Delegations to International Conferences

2d Session of UNHCR Executive Committee

The Department of State announced on October 5 (press release 697) the designation of Robert S. McCollum, Deputy Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, and Charles H. Owsley, Deputy U.S. Representative at the European headquarters of the United Nations at Geneva, as the U.S. Representative and Alternate Representative, respectively, to the second session of the Executive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which will convene at Geneva, October 6, 1959.

Robert K. Gray of the White House, Secretary to the Cabinet, will attend some of the meetings of the session and will bring to the Executive Committee a message from the President. Parker Montgomery, special assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, and George L. Warren, Jr., of the American Office of Field Coordination at Frankfurt am Main, Germany, will serve as advisers.

The 12th session of the U.N. General Assembly decided to allow the U.N. Refugee Fund (UNREF) to expire as scheduled on December 31, 1958, and authorized the High Commissioner to continue to give supplemental assistance in specific refugee situations within the framework of his office rather than through a separate fund. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees is Auguste Lindt of Switzerland.

Some of the main topics this session will consider include the progress on Hungarian refugees; the report on implementation of the General Assembly resolution on assistance to refugees from Algeria in Morocco and Tunisia; a program for camp clearance and a fund for special hardship cases; a program for new refugees in Greece; an emergency account for individual cases; and the status of governmental and private contributions.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

General Assembly

Supplementary Estimates for the Financial Year 1959 (Part I). Thirteenth report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the General Assembly at its 14th session. A/4221. September 21, 1959. 18 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Development of Under-developed Countries: International Co-operation for the Development of Under-developed Countries. Interim report under General Assembly resolution 1316 (XIII)—additional replies from governments. E/3258/Add. 2. July 7, 1959. 13 pp.

Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Addendum. Corrigendum. E/3263/Add. 1/Corr. 1. July 13, 1959. 1 p.

Calendar of Conferences for 1960. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3300 and Corr. 1. July 30, 1959. 6 pp.

Financial Implications of Actions of the Council. Summary submitted by the Secretary-General. E/3301. July 30, 1959. 6 pp.

Technical Assistance Committee. Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance Payments to the Special Account Including Voluntary Payments and Estimated Local Costs Assessments for the Ninth Financial Period (1959) as at 31 July 1959. E/TAC/REP/153. August 12, 1959. 5 pp.

Inter-Agency Agreements and Agreements Between Agencies and Other Inter-Governmental Organizations. Proposed agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Civil Aviation Organization. E/3302. September 10, 1959. 6 pp.

Trusteeship Council

Conditions in the Trust Territory of Somaliland Under Italian Administration. Communications dated July 30, 1959, from the Chargé d'Affaires of the permanent mission of Ethiopia to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General. T/1481. August 3, 1959. 2 pp.

Disarmament Commission

Letter Dated 7 September 1959 From the Representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the Secretary-General Transmitting the Text of a Communiqué Issued on 7 September by the Four Powers and Requesting the Convening of the Disarmament Commission. DC/144. September 8, 1959. 3 pp.

Verbatim Record of the Sixty-fifth Meeting, September 10, 1959. DC/PV.65. September 10, 1959. 81 pp.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

Letter Dated 7 September 1959 From the Representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the Secretary-General Transmitting the Text of a Communique Issued on 7 September by the Four Powers and Requesting the Convening of the Disarmament Commission. Joint draft resolution by several states. DC/145. September 10, 1959. 1 p.

Resolution Adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its Sixty-fifth Meeting on 10 September 1959. DC/146. September 11, 1959. 1 p.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and U.A.R. Sign Educational Exchange Agreement

Press release 689 dated September 30

The United Arab Republic and the United States signed on September 28 an agreement putting into operation a new program of educational exchanges authorized by the Fulbright Act. The signing took place at Cairo with Kamal al-Din Hussein, Minister of Education, representing the U.A.R. Government and Ambassador Raymond A. Hare representing the U.S. Government.

The agreement makes available U.A.R. currency received from the sale of surplus agricultural products in the United Arab Republic to finance exchanges of persons between the two countries to study, conduct advanced research, teach, or engage in other educational activities. The purpose of this program will be to further mutual understanding between the peoples of the United Arab Republic and the United States through a wider exchange of knowledge and professional skills. Exchanges of persons under the Fulbright Act are carried out as a regular part of the international educational exchange program of the Department of State.

Under the terms of the agreement a binational commission, to be known as the Commission for the Exchange of Students and Professors Between the United States of America and the United Arab Republic, will be established in Cairo to facilitate the administration of the program. The Com-

mission's board of directors will consist of eight members, with equal representation of U.A.R. and U.S. citizens. In addition, the U.S. Ambassador and the U.A.R. Minister of Education will serve jointly as honorary chairmen of the board.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Protocol of amendment to the convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences of January 15, 1944 (58 Stat. 1169). Opened for signature at Washington December 1, 1958.¹
Signature: Haiti, June 1, 1959.

Aviation

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.
Ratification deposited: Guinea, June 26, 1959.

International Court of Justice

Statute of the International Court of Justice (59 Stat. 1055).
Declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction deposited (with conditions and reservations): India, September 14, 1959.² Effective until notice of termination is given.

Telecommunication

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3286), with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958.¹
Ratified by the President: September 10, 1959.

BILATERAL

China

Agreement amending the agreement of January 13, 1954, for the loan of two United States destroyers to China (TIAS 2916). Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei September 22, 1959. Entered into force September 22, 1959.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement relating to air traffic control. Signed at Bonn October 1, 1959. Entered into force October 1, 1959.

India

Understanding that the assurances contained in the agreement of March 7 and 16, 1951 (TIAS 2241), are applicable to equipment, materials, information, and services

¹ Not in force.

² Over all disputes arising after Jan. 26, 1950, with regard to situations or facts subsequent to that date.

furnished under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (22 U.S.C. 1751), as amended, and such other applicable United States laws as may come into effect. Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi April 16 and December 17, 1958. Entered into force December 17, 1958.

Korea

Agreement on disposal of United States excess property located in Korea, with memorandum of interpretation and understanding. Signed at Seoul October 1, 1959. Entered into force October 1, 1959.

Lebanon

Agreement providing for a grant to the Government of Lebanon to assist in the acquisition of nuclear research and training equipment and supplies. Effected by exchange of notes at Beirut September 16, 1959. Entered into force September 16, 1959.

Peru

Agreement further amending the agricultural commodities agreement of April 9, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4045 and 4118). Effected by exchange of notes at Lima September 11 and 25, 1959. Entered into force September 25, 1959.

United Arab Republic

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Cairo September 28, 1959. Entered into force September 28, 1959.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, with exchange of notes. Signed at Cairo November 3, 1949. TIAS 2039.
Terminated: September 28, 1959.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Department Exhibits Photographs of Korean Monuments and Temples

The Department of State announced on October 2 (press release 693) that an exhibition of color photographs of Korean monuments of architecture and sculpture would be held in the lobby of the Department of State building, October 6-23. The exhibit is sponsored by the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Korea Society.

The photographs were taken by the U.S. Army Signal Corps and the U.S. Embassy at Seoul during a Department of State survey of the losses and survivals of historic and artistic monuments during the Korean conflict. The survey was made by Ardelia R. Hall, Arts and Monuments Adviser of the Department of State, in cooperation with the Embassy at Seoul and the Korean Government.

This exhibition is the first showing of the Signal Corps photographs of Korea's national treasures.

October 26, 1959

The photographs portray temples and palaces in the natural beauty of their mountain settings. They also show stone monuments and gilded bronze statues, masterpieces of sculpture from the seventh and eighth centuries A.D. Following this exhibition three duplicate exhibits will be sent on tours in the United States and Europe.

Closing of Consulate at Niagara Falls

Press release 685 dated September 30

The Department of State announced on September 30 that the U.S. consulate at Niagara Falls, Ontario, Canada, will be closed to the public on November 27 and its functions transferred to the U.S. consulate general at Toronto.

After November 27, 1959, all visa, citizenship, and other consular services formerly rendered by the Niagara Falls office will be handled by the U.S. consulate general at 360 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

The decision to close the Niagara Falls office was reached after consideration of a study which showed that the functions of the consulate could be carried on more economically by the consulate general in Toronto and that transportation facilities were such that few people would be inconvenienced by this decision.

Recess Appointments

The President on October 5 appointed Walter P. McCaughy to be Ambassador to Korea. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 700 dated October 6.)

Designations

James G. Hoofnagle as Deputy Budget and Finance Officer, effective August 23.

Edwin E. Vallon as Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, effective October 4.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Mutual Security in Action—Pakistan. Pub. 6819. Near and Middle Eastern Series 40. 12 pp. 10¢.

A fact sheet discussing the country, government, economy,

and problems of Pakistan and the extent of the U.S. assistance programs.

Development of Resources Key to Iran's Future. Pub. 6840. Near and Middle Eastern Series 42. 14 pp. Limited distribution.

Address delivered by Harry A. Brenn, Director of U.S. Operations Mission in Iran, before the Iran-America Society at Tehran, Iran, on May 6, 1959.

U.S. Participation in the UN. Pub. 6852. International Organization and Conference Series 4. xvii, 300 pp. 75¢.

An annual report by the President to the Congress on the participation of the United States in the United Nations during 1958.

U.S. Participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pub. 6870. International Organization and Conference Series 5. 58 pp. Limited distribution.

The second annual report by the President to the Congress on the participation of the United States in the International Atomic Energy Agency for the year 1958.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4238. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Uruguay, supplementing agreement of February 20, 1959. Signed at Montevideo May 21, 1959. Entered into force May 21, 1959, with exchange of notes.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4239. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Brazil, amending agreement of December 31, 1956, as corrected and amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 29, 1959. Entered into force May 29, 1959.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4245. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Poland. Signed at Washington June 10, 1959. Entered into force June 10, 1959, with exchange of notes.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4246. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Argentina. Signed at Washington June 12, 1959. Entered into force June 12, 1959, with exchanges of notes.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4248. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Indonesia. Signed at Djakarta May 29, 1959. Entered into force May 29, 1959, with exchanges of notes.

Army, Naval, and Air Force Missions to Ecuador. TIAS 4249. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ecuador, amending agreements of June 29, 1944, as amended and extended, and December 12, 1940, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Quito February 25 and May 22, 1959. Entered into force May 22, 1959.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 4251. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and

Viet-Nam. Signed at Washington April 22, 1959. Entered into force July 1, 1959.

Defense—Credit Sales of Military Equipment, Materials, and Services. TIAS 4252. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the NATO Maintenance Supply Services System. Signed at Paris June 22, 1959. Entered into force June 22, 1959.

American Commission for Cultural Exchange With Italy—Educational Exchange Program. TIAS 4254. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Italy, amending agreement of December 18, 1948, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rome June 17, 1959. Entered into force June 17, 1959.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 5-11

Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to October 5 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 680 of September 29, 685 and 689 of September 30, and 693 of October 2.

No.	Date	Subject
696	10/5	U.S. observer delegation to CENTO ministerial meeting (rewrite).
697	10/5	U.S. delegation to U.N. refugee meeting (rewrite).
698	10/5	U.S. members of Permanent Court of Arbitration (rewrite).
†699	10/5	Brand: Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry.
*700	10/6	McConaughy appointed Ambassador to Korea (biographic details).
701	10/6	Ethiopian Crown Prince tours U.S. (rewrite).
702	10/6	Herter: question of summit conference (combined with No. 703).
703	10/6	Herter: news conference.
704	10/7	Herter: CENTO ministerial meeting.
†705	10/7	Program for visit of President of Mexico (rewrite).
706	10/7	Dillon: "Strengthening the Foundations of Freedom in the Far East."
707	10/7	President Eisenhower: message to Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry.
708	10/7	DLF loan to Iran (rewrite).
*709	10/7	Holmgren receives ICA distinguished service award.
*710	10/8	Revisions on itinerary of President of Mexico.
†711	10/9	Refugee relief (rewrite).
712	10/9	Merchant: World Affairs Council of Philadelphia.
†713	10/9	U.S. delegation to conference on Antarctica (rewrite).
†714	10/9	Dillon trip to GATT meeting, Tokyo.
*715	10/9	Cultural exchange (Togoland).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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